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INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND
THEIR ROLE IN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE:
REFLECTIONS BY A "RECOVERING"~
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LAWYER*
DavidP. Portert
The Symposium's title question "Institutional Investors in
Corporate Governance: Heroes or Villains?" is intentionally so
broad that it leaves wide open the limits of discussion. In this Article,
I will focus my remarks on my perceptions, based on my
experiences over twenty-seven and one-half years of practice, about
the intersection between institutional investors and corporate
governance in the corporate, non-litigation setting.
To put my comments in perspective, I'll begin with some
comments on the role of the corporate governance practitioner. I'll
then discuss my views concerning "corporate governance," including
the differences between what I term "procedural corporate
governance" and "substantive corporate governance," and point out
the fundamental difference in the corporate governance model here in
Ohio, which is a "constituency state," from that of Delaware, which is
not. I'll provide my thoughts on what good corporate governance is in
practice, which necessarily includes some of my biases toward
corporate control issues in general. With that background in place, I
will then discuss how I believe institutional investors have influenced

. This commentary is an extension of remarks made by the author at the George A. Leet
Business Law Symposium "Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance: Heroes or
Villains?" held under the auspices of the Center for Business Law and
Regulation at Case Western Reserve University's School of Law on April 17, 2009.
tAdjunct Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law; retired
partner, Cleveland Office of Jones Day, where he worked 1981-2008. The author's views
expressed in this commentary are his own and do not necessarily represent views of any other
person, group, or firm.
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corporate governance, mostly for the good but sometimes for the bad,
by examining:
"

their role in establishing the current baseline of corporate
governance practices in the primary U.S. public capital
markets,

*

their role in the Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposal process,

*

the already large impact of proxy voting advisory
services, and the potential game changing impact from
the impending revocation of broker discretionary voting
authority,

*

the hidden world of shareholder 'jawboning,"

*

the somewhat recent emergence of "hedge fund attacks,"
and

*

the role of institutional investors

in the ultimate

battleground of corporate governance: takeover fights.

1. THE CORPORATE LAWYER'S ROLE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
I come to this Symposium as a "recovering" corporate governance
lawyer, someone who has only recently moved from active practice
into the academic world. Until January 1, 2009, 1 was a partner in a
major global law firm, representing numerous publicly-traded U.S.
corporate clients, and advising management teams and boards about
corporate matters across a broad spectrum of issues. Those issues
frequently involved the relationships of corporate executives or
Boards of Directors with the corporation's shareholders and with
each other-interactions commonly recognized today as corporate
governiance issues.
I am also an active participant in developing Ohio's corporate
governance law. As a member of the Corporation Law Committee of
the Ohio State Bar Association, which monitors developments in
corporate law and is the primary source for Ohio legislation in the
corporation law field, I have led or participated in numerous drafting
assignments and chaired various subcommittees, ultimately serving as
Vice Chair (2005-2007) and Chair (2007-2009) of the Committee. In
those capacities, I have testified numerous times before committees of
the Ohio General Assembly on proposed corporate legislation,
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including a number of measures directly affecting corporate
governance.'
Throughout my years of practice, and as I heard echoed in some
of the remarks earlier in this Symposium, I have observed a tendency
by some observers of corporate governance to view corporate
lawyers, especially those at large firms, as primarily "defenders
of management" and presumptive enemies of good corporate
governance. I vehemently disagree. I'll start off by discussing what I
see as the proper role of corporate governance lawyers.
My perspective is that of a corporate lawyer, a non-litigator. In the
corporate governance arena, the corporate lawyer serves primarily as
an "advisor." Under the Model Rule of Professional Conduct (the
"Model Rules"), 2 and their Ohio analog ("Ohio Rules"), 3 an advisor is
one who "provides a client with an informed understanding of the
client's legal rights and obligations and explains their practical
implications."A While at times a corporate governance lawyer may
also be an advocate, negotiator, or evaluator,' the corporate
governance lawyer's principal role is to counsel the Board of
Directors and officers about corporate governance laws, rules, and
related matters, their implications for the corporation's behavior, and
the relationships among various corporate constituencies. As a
counselor, the primary task is to propose practical, workable solutions
to relational issues, and to minimize litigation risks for the client.
But in the lawyer's role as an advisor on corporate governance
matters, who is the client? The short answer, under ethics rules6 and

IMost

notably, see the 2007 amendments to § 1701.55 in House Bill 134, which clarified
Ohio law on the voting standards in the election of directors (i.e., allows majority
voting standards). H.B. 134, 127th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2007), available at
http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/bills.cfin?ID=127_HRB_134. In addition, an omibus bill in
2006, House Bill 301, contained numerous amendments affecting corporate governance,
including provisions to allow limited amendments of corporate regulations by the Board. H.B.
301, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2006), available at http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/
bills.cfrn?ID-126_RB 301. For a detailed discussion of Ohio House Bill 301 and its evolution,
see David Porter, Competing With Delaware: Recent Amendments to Ohio 's Corporate Statutes,
40 AKRON L. REv. 175 (2007).
2 MODEL RULES OF PROFWL CONDUCT Preamble [2] (2008).
1OHIO RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble [2] (2007), available at
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/LegalResources/Rules/ProfConduct/proflonductRules.pdf.
4MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble [2] (2008); OHIO RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble [2] (2007), available at http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/
LegalesourcestRules/ProfConduct/prof12onductRules.pdf
5These roles are also described in the preambles to both the Model Rules and the Ohio
Rules. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble [2] (2008); OHIO RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble [2] (2007), available at http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/
LegalResources/Rules/ProfConduct/profl~onductRules.pdf.
6 See MODEL RULES OF PROW'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2008) ("A lawyer employed or
retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized
constituents."); OHIO RULES OF PROW'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2007), available at
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the securities regulations that are often applicable to corporate
governance lawyers,7 is the entity-the corporation itself. Of course,
in representing an entity, there must be some human representatives
to whom the lawyer reports and from whom the lawyer receives
instructions. 8 In a corporate setting, the representative will sometimes
be a member of the Board of Directors, especially in special counsel
assignments. More typically, however, the relationship is conducted
primarily through the general counsel, the chief executive officer or
another executive officer, or some combination of those officers. As
is vitally important for both the lawyer and the officers to understand,
the corporate lawyer is ultimately a servant of the Board of Directors,
just as the officers are. The Board (the group of directors collectively,
not individually) is legally recognized to be the highest day-to-day
decision-making authority for the entity. 9 Therefore, in a fight
between the Board and the officers, or the Board and individual
shareholders, the corporate lawyer must take his instructions from,
and owes his allegiance to, the Board.' 0

http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/LegalResources/Rules/ProfConduct/profConductRules.pdf
("A lawyer employed or retained by an organization owes allegiance to the organization and not
to any constituent or other person connected with the organization.").
7Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307 required the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
to establish minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys who appear and practice
before the SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006). The SEC codified the resulting rules in 17 C.F.R. §
205. See also Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities
Act Release No. 8185, Exchange Act Release No. 47276, Investment Company Act Release No.
25,919, 68 Fed. Reg. 6,296 (Feb. 6, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/fmnal/338185.htm. Rule 205.3 provides:
An attorney appearing and practicing before the Commission in the
representation of an issuer owes his or her professional and ethical duties to the
issuer as an organization. That the attorney may work with and advise the issuer's
officers, directors, or employees in the course of representing the issuer does not
make such individuals the attorney's clients.
Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 17 C.F.R. § 205.3 (2008). Because the
so-called "up-the ladder reporting requirements" contained in those rules apply to a broad group
of lawyers involved in the preparation of disclosure documents filed with the SEC, and attach to
breaches of "fiduciary duty" as well as to violations of the securities laws, many corporate
governance activities will be captured by those rules.
8See OHIO RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 1 (2007), available at
http://www.supremnecourt.ohio.gov/LegalResources/Rules/ProfConduct/profConductRules.pdf
("An organizational client is a legal entity, but it cannot act except through its officers, directors,
employees, shareholders, and other constituents.").
9See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001); OHIlO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(A)
(West Supp. 2009).
10Lawyers representing corporate clients do not have fiduciary duties to shareholders. As
was well-summarized by the SEC, "Decisions in a number of states recognize that, under state
law, an attorney for an issuer does not owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders." Implementation of
Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 8185, Exchange
Act Release No. 47276, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,919, 68 Fed. Reg. 6,296,

2009]

~INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS63

2009]

631

In most corporate work, such as corporate finance or mergers and
acquisitions, there is no tension between management and the Board,
because they are working together to achieve a common corporate
goal. But conflicts can, and do, arise whenever the interests of the
officers conflict with those of the entity. The greatest ethical test for
the corporate governance lawyer is to recognize when a conflict exists
between the interests of individual officers or individual directors and
the interests of the entity." It is then that the lawyer must understand
that his duty is to the entity, and be prepared to give his best advice to
the Board. Such a scenario is almost always the situation when one
speaks of corporate governance.
11. WHAT IS "CORPORATE

GOVERNANCE"?: PROCEDURE VS.

SUBSTANCE

It has been accurately stated that "[until the 1990s the phrase]
corporate governance was rarely uttered outside the arcane world of
law school texts and academic treatises."'12 Although I practiced what
we today call "corporate governance law" in the 1980s, we then
called it "corporate counseling." Surprisingly, given all of the
attention'13 that has been given to "corporate governance" during the
last two decades, the term itself is still not well-defined. It has been
variously described as "the system by which companies are directed

6,306 n.70 (Feb. 6, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8185.htin (citing
Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1491-92 n.60 (I11th Cir. 1991) (explaining that, under
Georgia law, "[I]t is a black letter principle of corporation law that a corporation's counsel does
not owe . . . [a] fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders"); Skarbrevik v. Cohen,
England & Whitfield, 231 Cal. App. 3d 692, 703 (1991) (explaining that, under California law,
"[a]n attorney representing a corporation does not become the representative of its stockholders
merely because the attorney's actions on behalf of the corporation also benefit the stockholders;
as attorney for the corporation, counsel's first duty is to the corporation"); Egan v. McNamara,
467 A.2d 733, 738 (D.C. 1983) ("According to the District of Columbia Code of Professional
Responsibility (Code), an attorney represents, and therefore owes a duty to, the entity that
retains him. . . . 'When retained to represent a corporation, he represents the entity, not its
individual shareholders, officers, or directors.").
1The clearest illustration of this point is in the termination of a CEO with whom the
lawyer has worked on business transactions and other matters. Although for various reasons,
including concern that the outside counsel is too close to the CEO, the board may choose to
retain special counsel, such action is not required. Indeed, many Boards opt to use the
company's regular outside counsel to handle CEO terminations as a way of softening the
harshness of the negotiations, since the usual outcome of a CEO termination is a negotiated
resignation, rather than a firing. So long as the lawyer's relationship with the CEO is taken into
consideration, this can be a prudent business decision.
12 MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1(1995).
13 One indication of commonality is the number of search results a term triggers on

Google. On April 24, 2009, "corporate governance" registered 21,200,000 hits. "Barack
Obama" registered 107,000,000 results.
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and controlled"1 or more fulsomely as "the set of processes, customs,
policies, laws, and institutions affecting the way a corporation is
directed, administered, or controlled. Corporate governance also
includes the relationships among the many stakeholders involved and
the goals for which the corporation is governed." 15 Robert A.G.
Monks and Nell Minow, in their excellent treatise entitled Corporate
Governance, now in its fourth edition,1 6 define corporate governance
aspirationally, as "the structure that is intended to make sure that the
right questions get asked and that checks and balances are in place to
make sure that the answers reflect what is best for the creation of
long-term, sustainable value." 17 While closer to the mark, even this
fails to capture what I think people mean when they refer to
''corporate governance."~
A broader, more complete, definition is simply how a corporation
is run. I see corporate governance as actually constituting two vastly
different matters. The first is procedural in nature-that is, what is
the system by which the corporation makes fundamental decisions?
The second is substantive-who makes the decisions and did what
they decide actually result in a good outcome for the corporation? The
process is readily measurable by third parties against objective
standards, while the substance is largely immeasurable, at least in real
time. This is because the true outcome of the decision-making cannot
actually be known until sometime in the future, and any present day
evaluation requires at least some degree of crystal-balling as well as a
high degree of subjectivity. Process also yields itself readily to lawyer
intervention (we are architects and engineers of a sort, quite able
8
to design and implement systems, policies, and procedures).'1
Substance, on the other hand, does not. Nevertheless, some Boards or
management may choose to involve lawyers in matters of substance,
although in such cases the lawyer is acting more in the capacity of a
14 BNET.com,
Corporate
Governance,
http://dictionary.bnet.com/defmition/
Corporate+Govemance.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2009).
15 Wikipedia.org,
Corporate
Governance,
http://en.wikipedia.orglwikil
Corporate governance (last visited Apr. 15, 2009). To similar effect is Margaret Blair's
definition: "the whole set of legal, cultural, and institutional arrangements that determine what
publicly traded corporations can do, who controls them, how that control is exercised, and how
the risks and returns from the activities they undertake are allocated." BLAIR, supra note 12, at
3.
16 ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MrNow, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (4th ed. 2008).
17 Id. at 3.
Is See George W. Dent, Jr., Business Lawyers as Enterprise Architects, 64 Bus. LAW.
279, 326 (2009), in which the author aptly describes corporate lawyers as castle architects and
litigators as soldiers in battle. In my own view, it is important to add to Professor Dent's
metaphor of corporate lawyer as architect the idea of "engineer," as corporate lawyers must also
implement designs (their own or others) to actually build the corporate castle's ramparts and
waterworks.
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sophisticated business counselor or wise man (i.e., someone who can
intelligently tell a Board or CEO that what they plan to do is stupid).1 9
This is not the normal role of most corporate lawyers, though many
may aspire to become so regarded by their clients.
Certainly, when lawyers speak of corporate governance, they
mostly mean procedural corporate governance. And as I'll discuss,
many of the activities of institutional shareholders are focused
primarily on procedure as well. Yet what I think most shareholders
really care about, and really mean by corporate governance, is not
"how does the corporation make its decisions?" but "do the people
running my corporation produce good outcomes? 20 The answer to "is
it well run?" is best measured by financial results, not process. To use
the vernacular, "what's important is the bottom line, stupid." And I
believe that substance is, at root, what matters in both the hedge fund
attack and takeover situations I discuss below.
Yet lawyers know that process can be important to outcome.
Having a checklist is one of the first things young lawyers learn about
19Though a tough thing to do, this sort of advice falls squarely within the lawyer's ethical
obligations. Rule 2.1 of both the Model Rules and the Ohio Rules provides the standard by
which a lawyer acting as a counselor or advisor must work: "In representing a client, a lawyer
shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice,
a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social,
and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2008); OHIO RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2007), available at
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/LegalResources/Ruies/Profi~onduct/profConductRules.pdf
As stated in comment [I) to both rules:
[a] client is entitled to straightforward advice expressing the lawyer's honest
assessment. Legal advice often involves unpleasant facts and alternatives that a client
may be disinclined to confront. In presenting advice, a lawyer endeavors to sustain
the client's morale and may put advice in as acceptable a form as honesty permits.
However, a lawyer should not be deterred from giving candid advice by the prospect
that the advice will be unpalatable to the client.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 1 (2008); OHIO RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.

2.1 cmt. 1 (2007), available at http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/LegalResources/Rues/
ProfConduct/profConductRules.pdfI
20 See, for example, the comments of Jeffrey Bronchick of investment advisory service
firm Reed, Conner & Birdwell, in a letter to the board of directors of Chesapeake Energy Corp.
regarding the CEO's reported $112 million compensation package: "If I could reduce it to one
page, I would fr-ame and hang it on my office wall as a near perfect illuatration of the complete
collapse of appropriate corporate governance." Ben Cassehnan, Chesapeake Holders Denounce
CEO 'sPay, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 2009, at B 1 (quoting Letter from Jeffrey Bronchick, principal
and Chief Investment Officer, Reed, Conner & Birdwell, to the board of directors of
Chesapeake Energy Corp.). I think it unlikely Mr. Bronchick is commenting merely on the
process of determining executive compensation, which is detailed in the company's preliminary
proxy statement for its 2009 annual meeting. See Chesapeake Energy Corp., 2009 Preliminary
Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 41-44 (Apr. 30, 2009), available at http://www.scc.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/895 126/0001193 12509082663/dprel4a.hftm#toc38309-44 (detailing the
changes in CEO compensation and the rationale uaed by the Compensation Committee to
support them).
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completing transactions; she who lacks a checklist (or fails to follow
it) may find herself without a key document at a closing, causing the
deal to fail. Checklists, policies, and procedures do play a role in
ensuring, as Monks and Minow put it, that "the right questions get
asked. 21 So I am not denigrating procedural corporate governance,
merely acknowledging that it is substantive corporate governance that
actually matters the most to most non-lawyers. The best procedural
corporate governance in the world may still lead to calamitous results,
and the "worst" procedural corporate governance may nonetheless
create great returns.
This procedural/substantive dichotomy finds a useful parallel in
the liability of directors: we punish directors not for making the
wrong decision but for not working hard enough in making their
decision. Procedural corporate governance is a major component of a
director's duty of due care, and failures of governance process can be
so grossly negligen t 22 that they form the basis for a viable complaint
against the director for breach of the duty of due care.2 In contrast,
poor substantive corporate governance, that is, poor judgment, is
unlikely to result in a viable claim against a director absent bad faith.
This is certainly true for Delaware corporations. Because of the
business judgment rule, Delaware courts have said "in the absence of
facts showing self-dealing or improper motive, a corporate officer or
director is not legally responsible to the corporation for losses that
may be suffered as a result of a decision that an officer made or that
directors authorized in good faith."2 This deference to Board
decision-making is supportable because corporate business decisions
are inherently all about risk and risk-taking,2 which are matters not
21 MONKs & MINow,
22 Gross negligence

supra note 16, at 3.
is the applicable standard for personal liability of directors for
breaches of the duty of care under the Delaware case law. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,
812 (Del. 1984) ("[U]nder the business judgment rule director liability is predicated on concepts
of gross negligence."), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del.
2000).
23 For example, an audit committee that neither meets with outside auditors nor questions
the financial statements presented by insiders would appear to have failed to meet the standard
of "care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar
circumstances." OHIlO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(B) (West Supp. 2009).
24 Gagliardi v. TniFoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051 (Del. Cb. 1996).
25 See, e.g., In re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. S'holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770 (Del. Ch. 1988).
Chancellor Allen wrote:
"Because businessmen and women are correctly perceived as possessing skills,
information and judgment not possessed by reviewing courts and because there is
great social utility in encouraging the allocation of assets and the evaluation and
assumption of economic risk by those with such skill and information, courts have
long been reluctant to second-guess such decisions when they appear to have been
made in good faith."
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only beyond a court's capacity to adequately analyze and assess, but
could, if judged, discourage directors from taking business risks,
thereby reducing the efficiency of the corporate model.
Put another way, "directors are not guarantors of the success of the
corporation's endeavors."2 The courts will not penalize directors for
their decisions, no matter how poor they seem in hindsight, so long as
they acted in good faith and followed good procedures in getting to
their "best business judgment" decision. And many Delaware
corporations have fur-ther shielded their directors from liability even
for grossly negligent procedures by adopting the charter provisions
authorized by Delaware General Corporation Law § 102(b)(7), a
statutory amendment adopted following the "surprise5 2 7 finding of
director liability in Smith v. Van Gorkom.28 The Delaware Supreme
Court has recently further bolstered the protections for Delaware
directors by its March 2009 decision in Lyondell Chemical Co.
v.Ryan. 29 In reversing the Chancery Court decision that had
denied defendant directors summary judgment despite existence of a
§ 102(b)(7) exculpation clause, the Supreme Court said the inquiry
was properly limited to one of whether the directors acted in good
faith. The court said that an "'extreme set of facts [is] required to
sustain a disloyalty claim."' 30 "Only if [the directors] knowingly and
completely failed to undertake their responsibilities would they
31
breach their duty of loyalty."5

In Ohio, where the business judgment rule has been codified and
strengthened, 2 it is even less likely that a director will be held

Id. at 780 (quoting Solash v. Telex Corp., No. 9518, 1988 WL 3587, at *8 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19,
1988)). As Chancellor Allen then continued, however, the business judgment rule is not
unlimited, and courts may explore whether the judgment was made in bad faith-a breach of the
duty of loyalty. Id. at 780-81. ("A court may, however, review the substance of a business
decision made hy an apparently well motivated board for the limited purpose of assessing
whether that decision is so far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment that it seems
essentially inexplicable on any ground other than bad faith.").
26 Richard P. Mandel, Choosing a Business Forn, in THE PORTABLE MBA INFINANCE
AND ACCOUNTING 225, 242 (John Leslie Livingstone & Theodore Grossman eds., 3d ed. 2002).
27 See Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An Economic and Behavioral Defense of
Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Business Judgment Rule, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 675, 676 (2002).
28 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (holding that the board acted in a grossly negligent manner in
approving a merger agreement), overruled by Gantlet v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
29 No. 401, 2008, 2009 WL 1024764 (Del. Apr. 16, 2009).
30 Id. at *7 (quoting In re Lear Corp. S'holder Litig., No. 2728-VCS, 2008 WL 4053221,
at * 11 (Del. Ch. Sept. 2, 2008)) (alterations in original).
31 Id.

32 See Pullins v. Holmes. No. 061N'040168, slip op. at 4 (Ohio Ct. Coin. P1. Knox County
Dec. 4, 2006), available at http://www.pullinslaw.com/uploads/av-decision.pdf (discussing
Ohio's statutory protection of corporate directors from personal liability under the business
judgment rule), afd., No. 06CA000037, 2007 WL 2549377 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2007).
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culpable for a bad corporate outcome. The statutory standard for a
director's personal liability is limited to those acts or omissions that
are "undertaken with deliberate intent to cause injury to the
corporation or undertaken with reckless disregard for the best
interests of the corporation." 33 Moreover, Ohio requires proof of any
such claim to be proved "by clear and convincing evidence,"3 a
higher standard than Delaware's preponderance of the evidence .35 So
in both Delaware and Ohio, and other states that follow similar rules,
directors may make decisions that are catastrophic to the corporation
with virtual impunity, provided that they employ proper process in
doing so.
An illustration of this point can be made by looking at whether
General Motors has displayed good corporate governance during the
past decade. From a purely procedural perspective, GM probably
more than meets the standard of having good procedural governance
practices in place. GM's Board has long been represented by Weil,
Gotshal & Manges LLP,3 which could call on the services of Ira
Millstein, now considered a dean of corporate governance law,'37 to

The relevant statutory provisions are found in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(C), (D) (West
Supp. 2009), which were adopted in 1986 as part of a package of legislation resulting from an
abortive takeover attempt against Goodyear Corporation by Sir James Goldsmith. See Michael
Ryngaert & Jeffry M. Netter, Shareholder Wealth Effects of the Ohio Antitakeover Law, 4 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 373, 373 (1988); Morgan Shipman, The Case for Reasonable State Regulation of
Corporate Takeovers: Some Observations Concerning the Ohio Experience, 57 U. CIN. L. REV.
507, 531-34. The Corporation Law Committee's comments on these sections include the
statement that:
The changes in division (C) are intended to make it clear that a director has the
benefit of a presumption that he is acting in good faith and in a manner he reasonably
believes is in (or not opposed to) the best interests of the corporation in all cases,
including those affecting or involving a change in control or a termination of his
services. It is believed that the changes are necessary because of the adoption by
some courts, notably those of Delaware, of the view that, in such cases, the director
becomes an interested party and, as a result, loses the benefit of the business
judgment rule.
OHIO GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 105 (Michael A. Ellis ed., Bowne 2009) [hereinafter Ellis].
33 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(D).
34 1d;see also id. § 1701.59(C)(1).
35 See 1 Lou. R. KLING & EILEEN T. NUGENT,
NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF
COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS 4-19 n.34 (2005) (discussing that while Delaware
chancellors had yet to explicitly articulate the appropriate standard, the preponderance of the
evidence standard has been recognized in dicta and most likely applies).
36 MONKS & MiNOw, supra note 16, at 440.
37 See, e.g., An Architect of Governance, DIRECTORSHIP MAG., Oct.-Nov. 2007, at 26, 26
("Ira Milistein is arguably the top lawyer in America in the practice of corporate govemnance. As
a senior partner at the law firn of Weil, Gotshal & Manges, where Millstein has worked since
1951, he has been so influential on the topic that not only did he rank number eight on The
Directorship100, a listing of the most influential people in corporate governance, but Yale Law
School named its Center on Corporate Governance after himn.").
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advise it and help it refine and improve its practices before the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its progeny made such practices required
practices for exchange-listed companies. As early as 1993-albeit
after a long period of turmoil and shareholder unreSt 38-the GM
Board understood it needed a majority of outside directors and a lead
director, and that independent directors needed to meet in
executive session and oversee board practices . 39 A look at its
corporate proxy statements shows the GM Board of recent years has
had all the bells and whistles of a solid board, including diversity, a
majority of independent directors' 40 and other good corporate
governance practices . 4 ' By these standards, GM appears to be a model
of good procedural corporate governance.
Yet with GM's recent bankruptcy,4 how can the GM directors say
that their corporate governance was substantively effective? Has the
company been well-run? I think many people would say that
managing an automotive company into bankruptcy, or a major bank
into TARP and billions of dollars of tax dollar infusions, is prima
facie evidence of an ineffective Board, and therefore we can't
commend their corporate governance from a substantive viewpoint.
But is this a correct view?
Challenging the GM Board's substantive corporate governance
means assessing the quality of both the decisions and the GM
38 See generally MONKS & MINOW, supra note 16, at 4 12-50, for a fascinating case study
of General Motors's corporate governance history.
39

Id. at 445.

For example, the last pre-Sarbanes-Oxley Act proxy statement (2002) names twelve
nominees for director. Of these, one (Karen Katen) is female, one (Nobuyuki Idei) Japanese, at
least one (Stanley O'Neal) is African-American, one (Armando Codina) is a probable Hispanic,
another (Percy Barnevik) a European. Only two are insiders. The outside directors show
diversity of industry groups with relevance to a company that manufactures and sells consumer
products, including executives or former executives of Compaq, Eastman Kodak, Pfizer, Procter
& Gamble, Sara Lee, and Sony. See Gen. Motors Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF
14A), at 2-4 (Apr. 18, 2002). And director Stan O'Neal of Merrill Lynch would
presumptively have brought financial industry savvy; no one could then predict his later
troubles at Merrill Lynch, where he was forced to resign under pressure following that
company's record losses. See Bradley Keoun, Merrill CEO Under Pressure to Resign on
Record Loss,
BLOOMBERG.COM,
Oct.
27,
2007,
http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid-2060t087&sid=aU9M2CggrVw&refer--home; Merrill Lynch chief leaves firm,
BBC NEWS, Oct. 30, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7069383.stm.
41 For example, in response to a shareholder proposal at the last pre-Sarbanes Oxley Act
annual meeting in 2002, which asked that a bylaw be adopted to require that all members of the
audit, nominating, and compensation committees be independent, the Board was able to respond
that all members of those committees (and several others) were already required to be
independent directors under corporate govemnance guidelines adopted in 1994. Id. at 26-27.
42 See the July 14, 2009 filing by Motors Liquidation Company, formerly General Motors
Corporation, which describes the sale of all or substantially all of the assets of the former
General Motors Corporation in a sale utilizing § 363 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code. Motors
Liquidation Company, Current Report (Form 8-K) (July 14, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40730/0001 193 12509 148748/d8k.htmn.
40
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leadership. Who really can do that objectively and fairly, other than
those who actually were there at the time, knew what the directors
knew, and had the same opportunity to make decisions? I think
today's critics of the GM management are simply commenting on an
outcome now discernable with 20/20 hindsight, and are not in a
position to challenge the actual quality of the decision-making itself,
as opposed to the quality of the decision-making process.
There seems no reason to believe that the GM board process was
deficient, or that directors were negligent in their due care. I am sure
they were not blind to the competition's strength, the risks attendant
to the unfunded post-retirement liabilities, or the costs of North
American unionized labor. Maybe the directors then in place were
incapable of making the right decisions, or maybe they were capable
of making correct decisions, but made poor ones.44 Maybe there were
no possible correct decisions, or possibly, just possibly, the directors
made correct decisions but things just didn't work out to the
corporation's advantage ("sh*t happens"). Regardless of which was
the case, there is probably no director liability for any of these
outcomes. Only if a director is shown to be self-interested or having
an improper motive would there be a viable breach of fiduciary duty
claim against the director for a failure of substantive corporate
governance.
Having identified the division between procedural and substantive
corporate governance, where do the shareholders come in? As we'll
see, shareholders, especially institutional investors, can play a role in
each type of corporate governance. Shareholders were key
participants in creating our modem governance procedures, and
continue to lobby for changes at specific companies, including
petitioning for changes in governing documents such as articles of
incorporation and regulations/bylaws. On the substantive side,
shareholders can influence-or in extreme circumstances compeldirectors to change corporate direction, toss out managers who don't
manage well, or even sell the company. But we'll also see that most

43 Selecting leaders is not an easy task. Consider President Lincoln's difficulties in
selecting his top general. Ask yourself if you would have chosen George A. McClellan-who
dressed impeccably, was a successful businessman, and was known for his skill in organizing
and disciplining his armies-or Ulysses Grant-who wore a private's blouse, was a business
failure, and was reputed to be a drunkard. Of course, General McClellan failed in the acid test of
"who can whip Bobby Lee?," while General Grant did not.
44 Dwight D. Eisenhower performed brilliantly in overseeing Operation Overlord, the
invasion of Normandy, but failed to guard against the German counteroffensive known as the
Battle of the Bulge. Douglas MacArthur directed a brilliant counterattack at Inchon but blew it
when chasing the North Koreans to the Yalu River.
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investors, including most institutional investors, don't take an active
part in corporate governance.
111. WHO ARE THE DIRECTORS WORKING FOR? IN OHIO (AND OTHER
"CONSTITUENCY STATES"), IT MAY SURPRISE YOU

Perhaps the most fundamental question in substantive corporate
governance is for whom does the Board of Directors work? For many
laymen and law professors,4 there is an assumption that the
corporation, and in turn the Board, serve primarily, or even solely, to
maximize shareholder wealth.4 That is, corporations exist to enrich
the shareholders, and any deviation from that purpose is wrong.4
What is fascinating to me as one who practiced in this area is that
support for this seemingly simple economic premise, much beloved
by academics like Milton Friedman 4, is largely lacking from our
corporate statutes and modemn case law. Indeed, the contrary position
appears explicitly in the corporate codes of over thirty states4 9 that

45 See Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & Bus.
REv. 163, 166 (2008) (asserting that both groups continue to rely on the case to support the
faulty premise that the purpose of a corporation is to maximize shareholder wealth); see also

JOEL

BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND POWER

35

(2004) (discussing the viewpoints of a number of prominent business people, all of whom assert
that corporations are set up to maximize shareholder value, rather than advance social goals).
46 As Professor Stout identifies, this viewpoint derives from literature dating back to the
famous 1919 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. case, in which the court, finding against Henry Ford in
his plan to retain earnings, increase production, and reduce the price of cars in place of paying
dividends, said, in what Stout argues is dicta, -'[a] business corporation is organized and carried
on primarily for the profit of the stockholders."' Stout, supra note 45, at 165 (quoting Dodge v.
Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919)). The notion was also the conclusion in early
writings such as those of Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means in their seminal 1933 work,
ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (Transaction Publishers 1991). See, e.g., id. at 293 ("It is traditional that a
corporation should be run for the benefit of its owners, the stockholders . .); see also William
W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy's CorporatistOrigins: Adolf Berle and
The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 100 (2008) ("(Slhareholder primacy prevails today
as the dominant view. .. )
47 This view, taken to an extreme, causes some Americans to perceive corporations as
inherently evil, "a pathological institution." BAKAN, supra note 45, at 2.
48 Those who support the shareholder wealth maximization doctrine echo the words of
Nobel Laureate Professor Milton Friedman, who wrote in 1970 "there is one and only one social
responsibility of business-to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its
profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free
competition without deception or fraud." Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of
Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, (Magazine), at 32 (quotation
marks omitted).
49 See 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.30 cmt. at 8-209 (4th ed. 2008); see also Stout,
supra note 45, at 169 (noting that "a large majority" of the states have other-constituency
provisions that allow them to consider interests other than the shareholders'). See generally
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REV.
971 (1992) (discussing the implications and interpretation of other constituency statutes).
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contain so-called "constituency provisions"5 0 ("constituency states").
Even non-constituency states, such as Delaware, do not apply this
approach to limit the broad discretion of directors except in the
instance of the sale of the corporation 5 1 when so-called Revlon
duties 52 apply. As an illustration of how states have limited
shareholder primacy, one would suppose that shareholders would like
to have the power to determine when they will receive dividends and
when they will sell the company as an entirety. But states have
restricted those rights, for example, by providing for the declaration
of dividends by the Board, and not the shareholders, and requiring
that the Board approve any merger.5 Neither restriction is inherently
required to support the corporate form, yet the restrictions exist.
I therefore view the "shareholder wealth maximization" premise to
be fallacious as a statement of the law except in isolated
circumstances, and then only in some states. 55 What I believe instead
is that shareholder wealth maximization is, indeed, a major, often
predominant activity of corporations, but that states have expanded
permissible corporate activities and goals far beyond shareholder
wealth maximization either by the courts or by statute. Accordingly,
corporate directors may appropriately pursue these court- or
statutorily-sanctioned social responsibilities with no direct benefit to,
and often at the expense of, shareholders. It is, thus, the Board that
has the primary responsibility for determining the timeframe for
shareholder wealth maximization, that is, how fast the corporation
will grow, whether and when it will pay out dividends, and whether to
50The term "constituency provision" refers to statutes, generally adopted in the 1980s in
response to takeover bids, that provide, as does Ohio's statute, that directors, in fulfilling their
duties to the corporation, may (and in Connecticut's case, must) consider interests other than
those of the shareholder in making their decisions. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-756(d) (West
2005); OHIlO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (West Supp. 2009).
51 See Stout, supra note 45, at 169-72 (discussing that except in the context of the
corporation's sale, many modem Delaware cases suggest that Boards have a duty to consider
constituents other than the shareholders and protect directors against claims that they failed to
appropriately maximize shareholder wealth).
52 These "duties" require Delaware directors in situations involving the actual sale of the
corporation to maximize the return to the shareholders. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). The Revlon duties are actually simply extensions of
the normal fiduciary duties of loyalty and due care, but focused on a specific objective:
maximizing the sale price. See Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan, No. 401, 2008, 2009 WL
1024764, at *3 (Del. Apr. 16, 2009).
53 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (200 1); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.3 3 (West
Supp. 2009); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. §6.40 (2008).
s4 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (Supp. 2004); OHIlO REV. CODE ANN. §
1701.78(D) (West 1994); MODEL Bus. COP. ACT § 11.04 (2008).
55See Stout, supranote 45, at 169 ("What about state corporation codes? Do they perhaps
limit the corporate purpose to shareholder wealth maximization? To employ the common
saying, the answer is 'not just "no," but "hell no."").
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sell, merge, or otherwise terminate the corporation's existence. Some
shareholders may wish otherwise, and as I'll show later, shareholders
may have real influence over the Board to make it so, but the law is
not on their side, at least in this state.
Corporations are a creature of state law. There is of course no
fundamental constitutional or common law right to incorporate under
federa 5 6 or state law . 57 The right to incorporate (and thereby for
shareholders to receive the benefits of limited liability) in a particular
state is given by the state in order to induce economic activity that is
expected to provide benefits to the state. The desired benefits vary
from state to state.
Delaware, for example, I.,as chosen to create a national market for
incorporating because the state thereby receives a tremendous boost
to its budget from the incorporation business.5 Delaware has no
expectation that Delaware corporations actually reside or employ
people in the state,5 or that they even have any business there. The
56

This has been accepted since the earliest days of the Republic. See

Head & Amory v.

Providence Ins. Co., 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 127 (1804), in which Chief Justice Marshall stated:
Without ascribing to this body, which in its corporate capacity, is the mere
creature of the act to which it owes its existence, all the qualities and disabilities
annexed by the common law to ancient institutions of this sort, it may correctly be
said to be precisely what the incorporating act has made it, to derive all its powers
from that act, and to be capable of exerting its faculties only in the manner which
that act authorises.
Id at 167. See also Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U.S. 594 (1890), where the Court said:
The right or privilege to be a corporation, or to do business as such body, is one
generally deemed of value to the corporators, or it would not be sought in such
numbers as at present. It is a right or privilege by which several individuals may
unite themselves under a common name and act as a single person, with a succession
of members, without dissolution or suspension of business and with a limited
individual liability[.] The granting of such right or privilege rests entirely in the
discretion of the State, and, of course, when granted, may be accompanied with such
conditions as its legislature may judge most befitting to its interests and policy.
Id. at 599-600; see also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) ("Corporations are creatures of
state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that,
except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to
stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation."); CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of Arn., 481 U.S. 69, 91 (1987) ("It thus is an accepted part of the business
landscape in this country for States to create corporations, to prescribe their powers, and to
define the righta that are acquired by purchasing their shares.").
57 See, e.g., OHIO CONST art. XIII, § 2 ("Corporations may be formed under general laws;
but all such laws may, from time to time, be altered or repealed.").
58 Revenue associated with granting charters and related income will approximate
21.7 percent of Delaware's state budget in 2010. DEL. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET,
FY 2010 GOVERNOR'S FINANCIAL SUMMARY, CHARTS, AND SCHEDULES 1 (2009),
http://budget.delaware.gov/fy20l10/operating/lOopfinsuincharts.pdf. For additional discussion
concerning the relative positions of Delaware and Ohio as states of incorporation, see Porter,
supranote 1, at 176-78.
59 There are certainly ancillary employment benefits to people and entities that derive their

642

642

WESTERN
~CASERESERVE LAW REVIEW

[o.5: 59:3
[Vol.

key benefit to the state is the taxes and other fees derived from
corporations whose business is usually elsewhere (DuPont being an
obvious exception). In my view, Delaware, like Nevada and North
Dakota, two other states that seek foreign incorporators, are truly
60
"flag of convenience" states.
In contrast, other states focus not on creating a convenient place
for foreign incorporators, but to provide a solid foundation for local
businesses. For example, my work with the Ohio Legislature has
amply proved to me that the State of Ohio grants corporate charters
not to compete with Delaware in the business of granting charters, 6
but to further the State's interests in creating and retaining jobs
associated with the corporations that have significant business
connections with our state.6 That is, the State of Ohio, in its desire to
attract capital to businesses that create jobs within the state, is willing
to extend the blessings of limited liability to investors (shareholders),
but in exchange for that privilege has retained certain rights and
privileges for itself. It retains those rights and privileges by adopting
statutory provisions that prevent shareholders from having as much
control over the corporation as perhaps those holders might like or

business from these incorporations, such as the employees of the secretary of state, the chancery
court and various law firms, and the corporate service firms.
60 Similar to the maritime "flag of convenience" nations of Liberia and Panama that sell
their flag to any ship that will wear it, there is no real state interest in the underlying economics
of the business. That doesn't mean Delaware doesn't do a good job. On the contrary, its
Chancery Court is a model for others to emulate. Porter, supra note 1, at 185. Nevada is
sometimes identified, especially in the western United States, as an alternative to Delaware. See,
e.g., Karen Lange, Corporation Company, Selecting a State for Your Corporationor Limited
Liability Company: Delaware, Nevada or the State Where Your Business is Operated?,
http://www.score.org/women/site/articles.htnml?article-id627 (last visited Aug. 4, 2009); see
also LYNN M. LoPUCK, COURTING FAILURE: How COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTcY COURTS 235-36 (2006). As to North Dakota, it recently
adopted a corporate code for public companies specially tailored to the shareholder-primacy
groups. A discussion of this statute is in Professor Steven Bainbridge's commentary, Stephen
M. Bainbridge, Why the North Dakota Publicly Traded Corporations Act Will Fail
(UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 09-07, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssmn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract-id=1 364402.
61 That this is a long-standing Ohio policy can be seen from Professor Henry W.
Ballantine's 1927 comments on Ohio's recently enacted corporate code:
The result is the most carefully drawn and comprehensive legislative effort as to
corporations which this country has yet produced. The Act is not an attempt to go
into competition for the business of issuing charters to concerns doing business
elsewhere as are the laws of Delaware and Nevada. It aims to facilitate business and
remove useless impediments and at the same time safeguard the public ...
Henry Winthrop Ballantine, Recent Legislation, 15 CAL. L. REv. 422, 422 (1927).
62 Porter, supra note 1, at 185. This view is supported by the advice I have received from
legislators and others on how to present proposed legislation to the legislative committees: "It's
all about jobs."
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could theoretically enjoy. 63 In fact, Ohio sometimes differentiates
between corporations that have only nominal Ohio connections from
those that are more closely related to the state: neither the Ohio
Control Share Acquisition Act64 nor the Interested Shareholder
Transactions Law 65 (also known as the "merger moratorium" act)
applies to Ohio corporations that lack a requisite presence in the
state.6
The key provision of Ohio law that refutes the shareholder wealth
maximization doctrine is the constituency statute (Ohio Revised Code
§ 1701.59(E)), which provides that:
[A] director, in determining what the director reasonably
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, shall
consider the interests of the corporation's shareholders and, in
the director's discretion, may consider any of the following:
(1) The interests of the corporation's employees,
suppliers, creditors, and customers;
(2) The economy of the state and nation;
(3) Community and societal considerations;
(4) The long-term as well as short-term interests of
the corporation and its shareholders, including the
possibility that these interests may be best served by
67
the continued independence of the corporation.

63 For example, Board action is required to declare dividends, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1701.33 (West Supp. 2009), sell all the corporate assets, id. § 1701.76, or accomplish a merger
id. § 1701.78. And Boards may adopt "shareholder rights plans", or "poison pills." id. §
1701.16, and resist change-of-control transactions, id § 1701.59, without alteration of the
standard of care.
-4 Id. § 1701.83 1.
65 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1704.01-07 (West 1994 & Supp. 2009).
66 In general, the anti-takeover legislation does not become applicable to a corporation
simply because it incorporates itself in Ohio. Some greater nexus is required, such as having its
principal place of business, principal executive offices, assets having substantial value, or a
substantial percentage of its assets within the state. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1701.01(Y) (West Supp. 2009) (defining an "issuing public corporation" as having such
characteristics). The definition limits the companies subject to the control share acquisition
provisions of Ohio Revised Code § 1701.831, as well as those subject to the interested
shareholder provisions in Ohio Revised Code chapter 1704. See id § 1701.831; 0OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 1704.01-07 (West 1994 & Supp. 2009). For a general discussion of Ohio's
anti-takeover statutes, see Thomas E. Geyer, The Vitality of the Ohio Laws Designed to
EncourageNegotiated Takeovers, 23 U. DAYTON L. REv. 515 (1998).
67 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (West Supp. 2009).
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The comment to this legislation prepared by the Ohio State Bar
Association's Corporation Law Committee 68 and adopted in 1984
states:
The Committee believes that Ohio law presently permits a
director to take into account interests other than those of
shareholders; however, the Committee believes that it is
desirable to specify and clarify the breadth of the interests
69
[that] a director may consider.
One scholar has challenged the statement that the constituency statute
does not change the common law, suggesting that, "[o]ne possible
explanation for these statements is legislative misunderstanding of the
common law standards."7 While I disagree with that viewpoint, as
the Corporation Law Committee's comments actually reflected the
consensus view of the leading Ohio corporate law experts about Ohio
law at that time, it hardly matters. The law today is what the statute
says it is.
Under Ohio's constituency statute, it is clear that directors must
take into account the interests of shareholders. But it is also clear that
directors may take into consideration competing interests of other
constituencies. This has a major bearing on corporate governance. If
the Board takes into account other constituencies, this means the
shareholders' voice is no longer the only voice listened to by the
Board. A graphic representation of Ohio's corporate governance
looks like this:
Corporate Governance in Ohio (and Other Constituency States)

Shareholders

Managers]
may be
shareholders
as well

~

jo

s

.-

Management ;as

:::Other

Constituents

Managers
may be other
constituents
well

68 The Committee is the primary source of Ohio corporate legislation, and, as such, its
comments are relevant to Ohio judges and cited in judicial decisions. See, e.g., Armstrong v.
Marathon Oil Co., 513 N.E.2d 776, 785 (Ohio 1987) (relying on the Committee's comments in
order to interpret a particular corporate statute); see also Porter, supra note 1, at 176 (discussing
the import of the Corporation Law Committee Comments).
69 Ellis, supra note 32, at 105.
70 Bainbridge, supra note 49, at 992.
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In my illustration, I place the management below both the
shareholders and the other constituencies in terms of the Board's
relationships. Shareholders will always be above management qua
management, as managers owe fiduciary duties to the corporation 7
that the shareholders theoretically may enforce through derivative
actions. While other constituencies do not have this recourse, their
influence on the Board would place them in a superior position to
management in its officer roles. Yet, in Ohio and other constituency
states, the Board may well take into consideration the interests of
managers as employees on a co-equal basis with shareholders.
Investors who don't understand these fundamental relationships may
be in for a surprise, especially in the takeover context.
As participants in the Symposium can see, this chart varies
significantly from the corporate governance triangle presented by
presenter John Wilcox, which in cursory form looks like the
following:
Corporate Governance Triangle

72

One participant asked Mr. Wilcox where in his triangle one would
place the "other constituencies," his reply implied that the Board did
not have a relationship with them.7 Accordingly, I do not think this
triangle works well in constituency states.
71 See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.42 (2008) (detailing standards of conduct for
corporate officers). Neither Delaware nor Ohio currently has a statutory statement of the duties
of officers, but the Ohio State Bar Association Corporation Law Committee has proposed
legislation under consideration.
72 See John Wilcox, The Corporate Governance Triangle (Apr. 17, 2009) (on file with The
Case Western Reserve Law Review) (slide used during Mr. Wilcox's presentation at the George
A. Leet Business Law Symposium held under the auspices of the Center for Business Law and
Regulation at Case Western Reserve University's School of Law on April 17, 2009).
73 Archived Webcast: Symposium, Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance:
Heroes or Villains?, Introduction and Panel One: An Institutional Investor's Perspective (Case
Western Reserve Univ., Sch. of Law, Ctr. for Business Law and Regulation 2009), available at
http://law.case.edu/centers/business-law/webcast.asp?dt-20090417&type-flv&a=.
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IV. MY VIEW OF WHAT CONSTITUTES "GOOD" CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE

Before moving on to discuss institutional shareholders and their
role in corporate governance, I will describe what, in my view,
constitutes "good" corporate governance for public companies.
There are two sine qua nons to effective procedural corporate
governance. First, the corporation must have at least a majority of its
directors who are interested in having good governance procedures
and who are open to discussion and change. It is not possible for
lawyers to impose good procedures on directors who don't want
them! As a result, procedural corporate governance (the "how" of
corporate governance) is inexorably entwined with substantive
corporate governance (the "who and what"). Second, the corporation
must have governance lawyers, whether in-house or from outside
firms, who are committed to good corporate governance, have the
necessary knowledge and skill sets, and have appropriate access to the
Board. A CEO or general counsel who, in order to preserve her power
in the boardroom, uses her gatekeeper powers to block off
recommendations for change by governance lawyers is the natural
enemy of good corporate governance. The governance lawyers should
consider themselves extraordinarily lucky, as I was with so many
clients, to have a general counsel or senior officer who is actually a
strong advocate for governance, rather than people who view
governance as, at best, a necessary evil. Where you lack such support,
the task is so much harder.
Assuming such directors and corporate governance lawyers are in
place, here's my list of procedural corporate governance activities
through which the lawyers can help ensure there are processes in
place that create an environment that supports, to paraphrase Monks
and Minow, asking the right questions and making sure the answers
74
reflect what is best for the corporation:
*The governance lawyers must routinely provide the client
with state-of-the-art forms or updates of forms for
governance
policies,
committee
charters,
and
bylaws/regulations, as well as well-considered advice on
the manner in which quality boards function (these each
being appropriately tailored to the corporation after
taking into consideration any peculiarities of the
corporation, such as family control). In my view, there is
74

See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
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no "one size fits all" form suitable for every corporation.
There are certainly good models, and one can start from
there. But corporations have their own unique
personalities and ultimately it is the lawyer's job to adapt
the form to the client. The advent of the Internet and the
requirement that many corporate governance documents
be posted on the corporate website has greatly facilitated
the ability of lawyers to find better models from which to
work or ideas on how to improve their own forms. Prior
to the Internet, lawyers were often hobbled in locating
internal documents from non-clients to use as
comparisons, and needed to use their personal networks,
or join organizations, to find exemplars. Today, one can,
for example, quickly locate and compare the audit
committee charter of dozens of major corporations to
look for ideas.

*

The governance lawyers then must review these items
with an alert set of independent directors who constitute a
governance committee. These members must be willing
to spend time at meetings with counsel at least annually
to discuss governance issues. Based on these discussions,
the governance committee should think about the advice,
work with the lawyers to make any modifications or
improvements to existing procedures that the committee
thinks are appropriate, and, after due deliberation, come
to a reasoned decision on recommending to the full Board
their adoption.

*

The full Board should consider the governance
committee's recommendations and then adhere to the
policies and procedures. The full Board should be briefed
at least annually by the governance counsel on current
governance issues, and have the opportunity to ask
questions of counsel about the corporation's procedures
and practices.

*

The individual board members should routinely report to
the governance committee and, through the committee or
the corporate officers, should inform the governance
counsel of any issues, problems, or ideas that arise during
the course of the year.
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Next, is the part of procedural corporate governance that lawyers
can't control: what actually goes on in the boardroom. We can lecture
the directors on what they should do, but lawyers don't control what
they actually do. So all we can do is give the basic corporate law
"duty of care" speech, which goes along the lines of the following:
"In making your decisions, you, as a director of [a
Delaware/an Ohio] corporation, must act with due care. This
means that you must receive appropriate briefings, read all
the materials you are provided, seek out answers to your
questions, take your time to think about what's going on, stay
alert to the risk that management is pulling a fast one by
hiding salient facts from you, and consider the reasonableness
of what you are being told and whether the source is
reasonably reliable or not. You must work at your job. You
must think."
Giving such a speech could get you thrown out of some boardrooms.
But those are boardrooms (and clients) that maybe you are better off
avoiding anyway, if you value your reputation. One of the hallmarks
of a good corporate governance lawyer-and given their gatekeeper
status, 75 even more so a good securities lawyer-is being prepared to
be fired by a client or to fire a client who won't follow appropriate
advice.7
What about substantive good governance? How can one ensure
that the board makes good decisions that will lead to the best
outcome? One can't. All a participant in the governing process can do
is give good advice, challenge assumptions, and suggest alternatives.
I will add that I have seen decisions made by boards that seemed
prudent at the time, but later were shown to be poor decisions, and
decisions that I initially thought unwise that turned out rather well.
There were also a few decisions where my predicted poor outcome,
unfortunately, was later proved correct. But, in all cases, the directors
understood they were taking risks, and that was their job and their
decision. Neither I nor a judge must agree with their action.
75 See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC,
103 COLUM. L. REv. 1293 (2003).
76 See discussion supra note 19 regarding Model and Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 2.1. Put bluntly, lawyers may not dodge unpleasant topics nor avoid battles that could
result in the client's firing the lawyer. One hopes that good diplomatic skills and tact will get
you past any problems with your client, but one must not be afraid of being fired. Lawyers who
are, and who dodge tough issues, or always side with the one who hires them, may well he
viewed as "client friendly." Although they will avoid being fired and may well be more
successful for themselves or their firms financially, they ill-serve their client, and do so at the
risk of bringing opprobrium on themselves or their firms for breaching their ethical duties.
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But I do have some thoughts on issues that I believe a good
Board does think about when it is considering the substance of
decision-making:
0

Make certain that suggested plans or programs have been
looked at for long-term as well as short-term effects, not
just one or the other. One of the most common failings of
Boards is not asking for enough projections by either
failing to adequately challenge the assumptions of the
projections they do receive, or failing to play out enough
scenarios about the future. As we'vye see in the financial
market turmoil, not playing out the potential effects from
an upturn or downturn in the business can result in
horrific results. A good role model for a director is the
chess player, the best of whom map out moves, and likely
responses, many turns in advance. There's a reason
generals learn to play war games, and directors would be
well-served to follow that example. I understand the
deference given to the officers who present the suggested
plans or programs, but reliance on officers must be
reasonable, 7 and not questioning the underlying
assumptions could be a major omission. Lawyers,
especially the business counselor, sometimes can take on
the same task of substantively vetting proposed plans or
programs, but we're not often given the opportunity,
especially in larger corporations where lawyers are
usually relegated to a lesser role. Not only do the
directors have the opportunity to question and challenge,
that's their job.
*Consider how the decision, or lack of a decision, will
play with constituents. It is a mistake to not always have
investor relations in mind. The same goes for major
creditors, customers, suppliers, employees, and other
constituencies (whether you are in a constituency state or
not). If need be, have due diligence done with these
constituencies before the program is launched.

7See, for example, OHIlO REV. CODE ANN. §1701.59(B)(1) (West Supp. 2009), which
allows directors to fulfill their fiduciary duties by reliance on information prepared or presented
by those officers "who the director reasonably believes are reliable and competent in the matters
prepared or presented."
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Make certain the Board has savvy advisors. The law
entitles directors to rely on experts and consultants, so
Boards should employ them. Resist managers who say
the Board doesn't need to bring the gurus into the roomthat is just management trying to look self-sufficient, and
may in fact prevent you from hearing the consultants'
real advice, especially their hedges and assumptions. That
doesn't mean the Board must always hire extra people; it
may be enough to establish one-on-one contact with the
same advisors that management uses. They already have
the facts in mind. But the Board needs to be aware that
management's advisers may not always be fully candid
with the Board, so directors should consider the need for
separate advisers in appropriate situations.

" As a corollary, always ask whether we have the right
management team to implement our decision and protect
the corporation. I have experienced situations where a
Board doesn't ask itself if the management team is up to
the task, whether it is to carry out a merger/acquisition or
handle an SEC investigation. CEOs loathe saying they
and their team can't handle something; therefore, the
Board must always consider the potential need to seek
additional help. Adding to the headcount to ease business
integration of an acquisition is better than botching the
integration through lack of resources. Help the CEO help
herself.
*Directors should consider how they've seen similar
problems handled elsewhere, but should not insist that
their other experience should dominate the proposed plan
of action. I have seen situations where directors wrongly
import concepts that are either legally inappropriate
(e.g., applying the wrong state law or ignoring a charter
provision) or that don't fit the culture or circumstances of
the corporation. For example, a common failing of
financially oriented directors is to think that flattening a
corporate structure is a great idea (it saves costs). But
flattening the structure may eliminate the value of
subsidiary corporate veils, thereby exposing the "clean"
assets of one business to the "dirty" tort claims of
another.
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Act collegially. Don't be afraid to raise questions or
suggestions, and don't be too hasty in shooting down
each others' ideas. I have seen situations where "quiet"
directors have better ideas than the "noisy" or "strong"
ones. The fundamental strength of a Board is that a bunch
of smart people are together in a room to make a
decision. Everyone has an equal duty and equal vote and
therefore should have an equal say.

"

Make a decision. Inaction or delay is usually worse than a
wrong decision. But the Board should feel good about
delaying a decision if it Isn't comfortable about its
knowledge base. Get informed, and then act.
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Against this backdrop, I'll now respond to the Symposium's main
question.
V. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS: A NON-HOMOGENEOUS GROUP
The focus of this Symposium being "institutional investors," I
want to clarify that when 1, and I think most other practitioners, use
that term, it means a broad array of entities, including mutual funds,
hedge funds, and other investment companies, bank trust departments,
insurance companies, university and charitable endowment funds,
pension funds, investment banks, investment advisors, and portfolio
managers, among many others.7 Their common trait is that they
actively deploy the pooled capital of third party beneficiaries in the
equity securities markets. These players, who might also be called
money managers,7 generally are at least partially compensated in the
18 This is a refinement of commonly found definitions of "institutional investors." For
example, the first site identified on my April 6, 2009 Googlem"search for "institutional investor
definition" revealed the following: "Entity with large amounts to invest, such as investment
companies, mutual funds, brokerages, insurance companies, pension funds, investment
banks and endowment funds." InvestorWords.com, Institutional Investor Definition,
http://www.investorwords.com/2504/institutional-investor.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2009).
Similarly, Monks and Minow, while not explicitly defining "institutional investor," include in
their discussion generally the entities I mention, but omit investment advisers and portfolio
managers. See generally MONKS & MtNOW, supra note 16, at 131-222 (providing an in depth
description of institutional shareholders).
79 "Money manager" has also been defined more narrowly to only mean individual
decision-makers, rather than institutions. See, e.g., InvestorWords.coin, Money Manager
Definition, http://www.investorwords.com/3 105/money manager.html (last visited Apr. 6,
2009) (defining "money manager" as "[a]n individual who is responsible for the entire financial
portfolio of an individual or other entity"); BusinessDictionary.coin, Money Manager
(last visited
Definition, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/money-mnanager.html
Apr. 6, 2009) (defining "money manager" as a "[flinance professional who advises his or her
clients on investment opportunities and manages their portfolios on their behalf'). This
distinction seems highly artificial. After all, institutions don't make decisions, people do.
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form of management fees, and so are distinguished from individuals
or treasury arms of operating companies that make decisions for their
own portfolio and profit solely from their market wins. But
institutional investors are not homogeneous: some are long-term

investors' 80 some shot-term investors 81adsmr

pcltr

82

commonly known as arbitrageurs.
Some have broad discretion over the investments they make, while
others are limited to specific industries, regions, or niches such as
"socially responsible investing." Some are highly regulated, others
less so. Some are faceless entities lacking in public recognition, while
others are well-known through their actions or through a very visible
fund manager. But faceless or famous, institutional investors today
hold or at least control the purchase/sale/voting decision-making8
over most of the outstanding shares in most large public
corporations,8 and certainly most of the shares that actively trade in
the markets.8 It would be the very rare large public company that has
80 "Long-term" is another ill-defined term, but I intend for it to mean an investor with an
anticipated holding period of at least a year. Some would assign this term only for anticipated
holding periods of five years or more. See Campbell R. Harvey, Hypertextual Finance Glossary,
http://www.duke.edu/-charvey/Classes/Wpg/bfglosi.htmn (last visited Apr. 6, 2009) (defining
"long-term investor" as "[a] person who makes investments for a period of at least five years in
order to finance his or her long-term goals"). In any case, it means a long time. See, e.g.,
Lawyers.com,
Real
Estate
Investment
Glossary,
http://real-estate.lawyers.com/
Real-Estate-Investment-Glossary.html#sectL (last visited Apr. 6, 2009) (defining "long-term
investor" as one who is "interested in holding an investment for a long period of time").
81 As I use this term, "short-term investors" mean those who anticipate holding an
investment for seconds, minutes, days, weeks, or any period of less than a year.
82 "Arbitrageur" customarily refers to short-term investors using a sophisticated trading
strategy, for example, one:

who attempts to profit from price inefficiencies in the market by making
simultaneous trades that offset each other and capturing risk-free profits. An
arbitrageur would, for example, seek out price discrepancies between stocks listed on
more than one exchange, and buy the undervalued shares on one exchange while
short selling the same number of overvalued shares on another exchange, thus
capturing risk-free profits as the prices on the two exchanges converge.
Investopediacom, Arbitrageur, http://www.investopedia.conm/ternis/a/arbitrageur.asp
(last
visited Apr. 6, 2009). A common example of arbitrageur is in the merger arena, where risk
arbitrageurs evaluate the risk that a pending merger will or will not occur, and make trading bets
accordingly.
83 The voting rights to such shares may or may not accompany the purchase/sale
decision-making power, but for purposes of this Article, I assume that most often the two
powers remain combined.
84 MONKS & MINOW, supra note 16, at 132 (noting that as of 2002, institutional
shareholders owned over 60 percent of the equity of the largest multinational corporations).
85 According to The Conference Board, in 2005 institutions owned in excess of 61 percent
of the total public equities in U.S. companies, up from a bare majority in 2000. See
Press Release, The Conference Bd., U.S. Institutional Investors Continue to Boost
Ownership of U.S. Corporations (Jan. 22, 2007), http://www.conference-board.org/
utilities/pressDetail.cfm?press ID-3046 ("Institutional ownership of the largest 1,000 U.S.
corporations has increased from 61.4% in 2000 to a peak of 69.4% in 2004, and dropped just
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a majority of its equity voting power owned by individual
shareholders.
Because institutional shareholders come in all shapes, sizes, and
outlooks, it is not reasonable to expect that they all behave alike. One
expects that the behavioral pattern of a union pension fund is unlikely
to mirror a mutual fund that invests in an index portfolio, such as the
S&P 500 or Russell 2000. And neither of these will act like the hedge
funds led by activist-agitators Norman Peltz or Carl Icahn or Phil
Falcone, nor do these gentlemen necessarily act like one another, or
even exhibit the same behavior individually on a consistent basis.8
Reality bears this out: for every seller of shares there must be a buyer
of those same shares, and given the concentration of ownership in
institutional hands, there are institutions on both sides of many, and
perhaps most, market transactions. So talking about "institutional
investors" as a monolithic group is not possible .8 ' Nor, as we will see,
is their impact on corporate governance uniform. 8
VI. SOME HEROES, SOME VILLAINS, BUT MAINLY NEITHER-SIX
WAYS INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AFFECT CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE

To answer the Symposium's lead question, undoubtedly some
institutional investors are a positive good (both for the corporation
and for the American economy) all or nearly all of the time, and so
are presumably "heroes" within the question's meaning. Some would
likely put Warren Buffet, the "Sage of Omaha," in this category.
slightly to 67.9% in 2005, but still in record historic territory.").
86 Professors Kahan and Rock observe that: "in assessing the many instances where hedge
funds have adopted an activist posture in corporate governance and control transactions, one has
to keep in mind that only a minority of hedge funds pursue shareholder activism. . .. [Elven
most hedge funds that focus on equity securities are not activist ... "Marcel Kahan & Edward
B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
1021,1046 (2007).
87 As Monk and Minow put it: "[w]ith all of the talk of corporations being run for the
benefit of shareholders, it is surprising that so little attention has been paid to the past difference
and utter incompatibility of interests of different shareholding groups, ranging from index funds
to highly quantitative computer models." MONK &MINOW, supra note 16, at 5 1.
88 1am using the term "investor" very loosely to mean simply one who decides to buy or
sell a particular equity security. That includes many trading decisions that do not include any
judgment whatsoever as to the intrinsic value of the portfolio company or whether its
performance or management is bad or good, or based on real information about the entity and its
management. For example, an index fund may not make an independent assessment about the
quality of a portfolio company, as it simply buys shares of every company that falls within the
prescribed index from time to time. In my view, this sort of decision-making (rational as it may
be) would not constitute a true investment in the portfolio company and its management. It is,
however, an investment for purposes of this commentary, and the fund is an institational
investor.
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Other institutional investors may well be vicious, villainous
scumnbags-veritable Gordon Gekkos t9-that deserve our scorn at
best, and a cell in a federal penitentiary at worst. But far more
institutional investors-probably the vast majority-fall somewhere
in the middle between hero and villain, and are no more than placid
participants in the stock market with no active participation, and little
interest, in corporate governance issues. Indeed, my mental image of
most institutional investors is that of sheep chewing grass out in the
pasture-mindless creatures, moving in a flock, sometimes urged on
by the shepherd's dog (in today's environment, perhaps the
government?), sometimes scared by a scent of wolf.
But I can attest through my twenty-seven years in the trenches that
directors and officers of public companies do talk about and pay
attention to at least some institutional investors, and those institutions
have thereby separated themselves from the common flock.
Moreover, in my experience, almost every corporation will at some
point experience an interface with one or another institutional investor
that significantly affects the behaviors or decisions of directors and
officers as they go about their strategic and day-to-day management
of the corporation. It is in this very small number of interactions that
institutional investors have the opportunity to be either "heroes" or
"villains." Most institutional investors, however, are not visible in the
boardroom or executive suite at any time, and so can't even be
nominated for the hero/villain roles. So "neither" is also an answer to
the Symposium's lead question.
So now let me comment on specific ways institutional investors
affect corporate governance.
A. InstitutionalInvestors Were CriticalPlayers in Creating Today's
ProceduralCorporateGovernance System
Just as Willie Sutton famously targeted banks for his robberies
"[b]ecause that's where the money is," 90 corporations in need of
money are attracted to the public markets, and so to institutional
investors, because that's where the vast bulk of the investing market's
89 Michael Douglas won a Best Actor Oscar for his portrayal of this fictional character in
the 1987 movie Wall Street, directed by Oliver Stone. WALL STREET (Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp. 1987). The figure is thought to be an amalgam of Ivan Boesky, the arbitrageur, and
Michael Milken, the Drexel Burnham Lambert financier, who each served prison time as a
result of criminal activity in the securities markets. An excellent retelling of the shenanigans that
surrounded Boesky, Milken, and their cohorts is Den of Thieves. See JAmES B. STEWART, DEN
OF THIEvES (1992).
90 WILLIE SuT-FoN & EDwARD LINN, WHERE THE MONEY WAS 119 (Viking Press 1976).
Sutton denied he ever said this. Id at 120.
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money is. 91 Given the massive growth in investment funds held for
America's retirement and healthcare plans, coupled with the
tremendous efficiency of underwriters in tapping the institutional
capital market devoted to publicly traded securities, the retail
component of most public offerings has shrunk in size to be relatively
small to virtually non-existent. Visits to large institutions holding vast
pools of money are how you sell stock or bond offerings, not through
encouraging a retail brokerage force to sell to individual investors.
And the same is true of the secondary market; most equity securities
of public companies remain in institutional hands. Thus, corporations
that go to the public markets for equity capital inevitably focus the
bulk of their investor relations efforts on these institutional investors
or prospective investors. CEOs and CFOs travel around the world
visiting institutions for one-on-one chats that help build bonds
between investors and management. These perks are not available to
ordinary investors. Yet, despite such efforts, this cozying up to the
sources of capital will not, as we'll see, prevent the investors voting
against management.
To newcomers to the field like my students, the fact that
institutions dominate the corporate finance world would seem to have
little bearing on current procedural corporate governance, and
therefore little direct impact on most of the "corporate governance"
efforts of individual Boards and corporate governance lawyers. They
would perceive instead, and quite correctly, that procedural corporate
governance, especially the review, drafting, and disclosure work that
will be in their future as young corporate lawyers, is driven primarily
by well-defined requirements of the applicable stock exchange, the
SEC, and state corporation law. But we teachers need to remind our
students that the current systems and rules did not spring forth from
Washington and New York by governmental or even divine
inspiration, nor are they very old. Instead, it was over a long period
during the span of my professional lifetime that institutional investors
like CalPERS ,9 TIAA-CREF 9, and others were instrumental in
educating the SEC, NYSE, and others on the need for today's better
91 See supra notes 84-85.
92 The California Public Employees' Retirement System (CaIPERS) is one of America's

largest institutional shareholders, and has been extremely active for several decades beginning
in 1984. After a period in which it was only reactionary to others' proposals, it developed its
own highly public campaigns. See CAL. PUB. EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYS., CORE PRINCIPLES
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 4 (2007), www.acga-asia.org/public/
OF ACCOUNTABLE
files/CalPERS -2007_-6_- 5%20Core%20PofACG%20FINAL%20-T0CC .pdf.
93 TLAA-CREF was the first large institutional investor to run a proxy fight nominating its
own candidates for election to a board, successfully challenging the incumbent members of the
board of Furr's/ Bishop's, a restaurant chain. MONKS & MINOW, supra note 16, at 186-88.
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procedural systems. Were it not for their efforts in laying the
groundwork, followed by the impetus of corporate villains like
Enron 94 and others that accelerated the regulatory actions of
Sarbanes-Oxley and its progeny, it is unlikely that we would have the
present procedural corporate governance framework in place. Thus,
there were certainly heroes among the activist institutions, and we
should thank them for their efforts to have gotten us as far as we have.
But while the exchange rules themselves may have been created or
greatly influenced by past lobbying efforts of activist institutional
shareholders, today's students would be correct to believe that the
identity or mix of a particular corporation's current investors has little
impact on day-to-day procedural corporate governance. It really
doesn't matter very much that shares are held by Fund A and not
Fund B, so long as more than enough funds participate in the market.
Far more relevant to procedural corporate governance are the
exchange requirements, the makeup of the Board, the Board's
relationship with the Chief Executive Officer, the SEC's disclosure
requirements, and the effectiveness of counsel.
B. 14a-8 ShareholderProposals:Populism in the Corporate
Governance Market Place
The one time each year that shareholders become slightly more
visible in corporate governance is the period leading up to the annual
meeting of shareholders. It is then that many companies see at least
some stirring of shareholder interest thanks to the SEC and its Rule
14a-8.
Under state corporation law, there is little or no methodology
provided for shareholders to actively influence the strategy that the
corporation follows or to set parameters for governing philosophies.
94

The scandals surrounding Enron were famously depicted in the Oscar-nominated film

ENRON: THE SMARTEST

Guys

IN THE

Room (magnolia Pictures 2005), based on the 2003 book

of the same title by Fortune Magazine reporters Bethany McLean and Peter Elkind, BETHANY
MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST Guys IN THE Room: THE AmAzING RISE AND
SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON

(2003). An interesting corporate governance or securities law

course might well include this film, along with the earlier cited WALL STREET (Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp. 1987), and the made-for-cable film about the leveraged buyout of RJR

Nabisco,

BARBARIANS AT THE GATE

(HiBO 1993), as discussion materials. To understand the

importance of corporate activity towards constituencies other than shareholders, one might add
Michael Moore's 1989 documentary, ROGER & ME (Warner Bros. Pictures 1989). Other films
that might make the cut include THE SOLID GOLD CADILLAC (Columbia Pictures 1956),
featuring Judy Holliday as a small shareholder who undoes a nest of corporate thieves, and
OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY

(Warner Bros. Pictures 1991), in which a corporate raider played by

Danny Devito connives to take over an old family-run New England business. Just to remind
students that not all busmnesapeople are crooks, heartless, or greedy, we must include Frank

Capra's classic film,

IT'S A WONDERFUL LIFE

(Liberty Films 1946).
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Shareholders have the right to vote at a meeting once it is called, 95
and they may have a limited right to call meetings.9 But neither
Delaware nor Ohio law provides a mechanism, or even an expressly
identified shareholder right, to introduce a proposal before a meeting
97
once it is called.
Companies, however, with securities registered pursuant to Section
12 of the Exchange Act become subject to a more complete set of
procedural shareholder access rules9" favoring intervention by
institutional investors trying to influence both Board practices
(procedural governance) and corporate behavior and outcomes
(substantive governance). The federal proxy rules, notably Rule 14a-8
under the 1934 Act, dictate the mechanics of bringing a shareholder
proposal for public companies. 99 Proposals brought under Rule 14a-8
must be differentiated from the efforts of shareholders who actually
want to effect change in the strategic direction or control of the
corporation by changing the members of the Board itself.' 00
With the exception of the more aggressive binding (i.e.,
non-precatory) proposal form discussed below, I like to think of Rule
14a-8 proposals as generally being the corporate equivalent of
citizens petitioning the legislature. Neither effort actually changes
much of anything directly, but it does allow shareholders, in the
corporate setting, and citizens, in the civic setting, to feel like they
have a platform from which to influence the behavior of the
95 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.44 (West Supp. 2009) (entitling shareholders
to one vote per share).
96 See, e.g., id. § 1701 .40(A)(3) (limiting those who can call a meeting to the chairperson
of the board, certain officers, directors, and some persons holding 25 percent or more of all
outstanding shares).
97 Indeed, a credible argument can be made that in Ohio, there is no right to bring any
shareholder proposals before an annual meeting of shareholders, absent permissive provisions in
the corporation's articles or regulations. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.39 says only that "[aln
annual meeting of shareholders for the election of directors and the consideration of reports to
be laid before such meeting shall be held.."OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.39 (West Supp.
2009) (providing for annual meetings of shareholders) (emphasis added). This statute does not
identify' any right of shareholders to bring other matters before the meeting. In the absence of
inferring such a right into § 1701.39, Ohio shareholders hoping to bring matters before the
shareholders would be forced to rely on their rights to call a special meeting under § 1701.40,
which requires action by owners of 25 percent of all outstanding voting shares or such lesser or
greater proportion (but not less than 50 percent) as may be provided by the articles or
regulations. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701 .40(A)(3) (West Supp. 2009). To my knowledge, this
issue has never been raised in litigation or as an objection to a Rule 14a-8 proposal, and Ohio's
public corporations routinely acquiesce to shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8.
98 See Securities Exchange Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2006), and the rules
promulgated thereunder, General Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17
C.F.R. § 240.14 (2008). See generally MONK~S & Mt.Now, supra note 16, at 1 84-89.
99 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2008).
50
' See id § 240. 14a-8(i)(8) (excluding proposals relating to elections directly from the
company's proxy statement).
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corporation or government. As corporate lawyers, we tend to think of
these efforts as "attacks" on the Board (after all, our clients are
obviously perfect in every way, and anyone trying to insert
themselves into the boardroom must be the enemy!), but even using a
"corporate threat scale" modeled on the Department of Homeland
Security's terrorist threat scale, most Rule 14a-8 proposals would not
warrant even a "yellow" or "elevated" warning to management and
the Board.' 0 '
I view the vast majority of 14a-8 proposals, which are precatory in
nature (mere recommendations that action be taken without imposing
any obligations to do so), as being no more than a petition to redress
grievances or address a concern, because, like the legislative petition,
no positive action is required of the recipient. Corporations that
receive precatory proposals that have the support of even the vast
majority of shareholders are not thereby forced to take action; the
Board may continue to apply its own judgment as to what course it
should take on the matter. At the same time, a precatory proposal may
well have an effect on corporate action: Boards often will listen to the
vote and change policies or direction because of a strong expression
of shareholder sentiment. But my point is, they don't have to.
The most powerful factor in this relationship between shareholders
(who, after all, own the voting rights to elect directors) and directors
(who manage the corporation) is the basic corporate governance
construct of Delaware law (and of the Model Business Corporation
Act, which has been implemented in many states). Both require the
Board to act first before any amendments can be made to the
corporation's charter, preventing shareholders from initiating charter
revisions.102 These laws also place control of the management of the
corporation's business and affairs in the hands of the directors.'0 3
Once the state law takes these combined approaches to fundamental
corporate governance, the shareholders lose the power to directly
make meaningful changes in corporate direction.104 Only by
101
The Department of Homeland Security's scale is Green (low), Blue (guarded), Yellow
(elevated), Orange (high), and Red (severe). U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Homeland Security
Advisory System, http://www.dhs.gov/xinfosharefProgranis/Copy ofpress-release-O046.shtm
(last visited June 26, 2009). 1 believe this scale translates well to how lawyers and boards view
corporate governance threats.
102 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (2001) (requiring Board adoption of any
amendment to articles following the issuance of shares before the amendment can be submitted
to shareholders); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 10.03(a) (2008) (requiring board approval for
proposed amendments to the articles of incorporation).
03
1 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.0 1(b).
104See, e.g., CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 234-35 (Del.
2008) (discussing the balance between the shareholders' right to adopt procedural bylaws
against the Board's right to manage the corporation).
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persuading the directors to follow their will can the shareholders
effect change in corporate behavior. As I'll discuss later with respect
to Ohio, however, this construct is not the only way to arrange these
relationships.
In my experience, precatory proposals fall into three main buckets.
First, there are the common "social" proposals-sometimes by socalled "gadflies" like Evelyn Y. Davis 05 or similar "frequent filers"

who propose things like disclosure of a carbon principles

policy, 106

the creation of a corporate policy as to the human right to water,107 or
more disclosure of executive compensation' 0 8 (though one would
think the latter request should go to the SEC, which regulates
disclosure requirements). in my experience, these sorts of proposals
(which, if passed, would change corporate behavior, and so are
largely substantive rather than procedural) are most often almost
completely ignored at the Board level and normally cause only an
attempt by the corporation's lawyers to try to quash the proposal on
technical grounds or, should that fail, inclusion in the proxy statement
with a rather perfunctory reply from management (which is even
more perfunctorily endorsed by the Board). In what I often consider a
more enlightened corporate response, these proposals are sometimes
simply allowed to go to the shareholders on a "why waste time and
money arguing this point" basis. Of course, not every gadfly proposal
is useless or silly. Sometimes they are forerunners to more thoughtful
efforts in a similar vein, such as the "national campaigns" I will next
describe. In any event, it is incumbent on corporations and their
counsel to treat stockholders, even gadflies, fairly and with respect.
On the corporate threat scale, I rate these in the Green (low) or at
most Blue (guarded) range. Lawyers worry about them, but no one
else really does.
Second, every proxy season sees more-organized "national
campaign" proposals on "social" topics aimed at influencing
governmental or popular pressure to effect corporate policies (these
are typically substantive corporate governance, as they require
behavioral changes by the corporation). Often these proposals have
goals far beyond the subject corporation, and these too are often
basically ignored by the Board and responded to by the corporation's
'05 MONKS & MINOW, supra note 16, at 184.
106See,
e.g., JPMORGAN CHASE & Co., NOTICE OF 2009 ANNUAL MEETING OF
SHAREHOLDERS AND PROXY STATEMENT 36 (2009).
107 See, e.g., INTEL CORP., NOTICE OF 2009 ANNUAL STOCKHOLDERS' MEETING AND
PROXY STATEMENT 67 (2009).
108See, e.g., CornCast Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 30-31 (Apr.
3, 2009).
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lawyers either on technical grounds or with a brief management
response. But sometimes social proposals are the cause for the
corporation's management, who want to defuse the potential fallout
of governmental or public pressure, to negotiate with the
proponent. 10 9 An example of a circumstance where negotiation might
occur is in "glass ceiling" proposals. Few companies want public
discussion of whether they, in fact, have failed to hire and retain
minorities or females. On the corporate threat scale, I rate most of
these proposals in the Green (low) or Blue (guarded) range. Only in
fairly extreme circumstances involving especially noxious behaviors
that could potentially excite Congress or regulators to focus special
attention on the corporation will these proposals rise to the Yellow or
higher range. An example of the latter might be proposals
condemning the corporation's dependence on a supplier's reliance on
child labor"10 or corporate disregard of environmental issues that
would result in bad publicity and reduced sales."' The threat of
adverse publicity that could affect sales shifts the proposal from being
a lawyer's issue to being a CEO's issue.
My third category for proposals includes those aimed at changing
corporate governance procedures. These procedural governance
proposals-including calls for majority vote requirements in the
election of directors, cumulative voting, board declassification, limits
on poison pills, etc.-are taken more seriously by management and
Boards, regardless of whether the proponent is an institution or a
gadfly, as the issues they raise may ultimately be important to the
Board and to the corporation's defensive posture against takeover
attempts. I rate these as Yellow (elevated) or sometimes Orange
(high) alerts on the corporate threat scale. When these measures are
brought by gadflies like John Chevedden"12 or ordinary activist
i09Fo example, in 1993, CaIPERS had eleven of twelve companies they targeted prepared
to make concessions, and United Shareholders Association (a creation of T. Boone Pickens)
reported twenty-nine of fifty targets of shareholder proposals negotiated resolutions. MONKS &
MINOW, supra note 16, at 186.
10 See, e.g., Nike Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 23 (Aug. 12, 1996)
(requesting "the Board of Directors to review compliance with the Nike Code of Conduct &
'Memorandum of Understanding' with contractors concerning the company's 'commitment to
people, communities and the environment"').
"I In 2007, Newmont Mining took what many viewed as a largely unprecedented step of
endorsing a shareholder proposal that sought independent board committee review of the
environmental and social impacts of the company's global mining operations. See Ben Arnoldy,
Mining Company Agrees to "Green" Review, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 26, 2007, at 2.
112
According to an article in Crain'sNew York Business, Mr. Chevedden was responsible
for 125 shareholder proposals to 85 companies in 2008, and about 15 percent of all resolutions
filed by anyone between 1997 and 2006. Aaron Elstein, HarrassedCompanies Swat at Gadflies:
AIG, Citigroup, Time Warner Seek to Silence Vocal Group of Investors, CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus.,
Feb. 9-15, 2009, at 1.
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institutions like CalPERS, typically as part of a broad initiative
targeting many companies, they are treated with respect by the Board
but evaluated in the context of whether it is indeed common to other
companies. If so, there's no reason to be worried, and we can wait
and see how the shareholders vote. That leaves it pretty much as a
lawyer's issue initially; only if the vote is in favor of the proposal (or
in the relatively rare instance where a particular proposal receives a
violent reaction from one or more directors "on principle") does the
Board need to react. Occasionally, the general counsel or outside
governance counsel for a corporation will recommend a negotiated
resolution to the proposal because the approval trend is obvious and
the lawyers want to be ahead of the curve.
If, instead, the measure is brought by a group or institution known
as a hostile actor, such as by a hedge fund known to move from 14a-8
proposals to actual proxy contests, the corporation's lawyers,
management, and the Board will more likely see the proposal as a
prelude to more serious attacks that could come through a call for a
special meeting or at the next annual meeting, and will gird their loins
for battle, putting together a corporate defense team of litigators,
proxy solicitors, investment bankers, and other advisors. But given
the cost of proxy contests, and the relative infrequency of the "hedge
fund attacks" described below, this rarely occurs. Corporate
governance proposals are far more likely to be of the common,
seemingly benign, institutional type than the focus of a potential
aggressor. But Boards beware: acquiescing to significant reductions
in corporate defenses, like declassifying a board, could leave the
corporation more open to takeover attempts or predatory hedge fund
attacks.'
It is interesting to note that not all shareholder proposals need be
precatory. There is at least one state--Ohio-that does not follow the
Delaware General Corporation Law and Model Business Corporation
Act construct that requires Board approval before shareholders can
approve primary governance changes. Instead, Ohio allows
shareholders to change charter provisions without prior Board
action.' '1 This distinction is not well-known or understood, and Rule
13

1 See Neil O'Hara, Prepare for Attack.- What to Do When Hedge Funds Move In,
COMPLIANCE WK., may 2006, at 62.
114 See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.71(A) (West Supp. 2009), which specifies that
shareholder approval (without mention of the Board) is required for amendments to the
corporate articles, and id § 1701. 11(A), which has a similar rule with respect to the corporate
regulations. That Ohio's legislature knows how to require Board action in addition to
shareholder approval is clear from other corporate statutes, such as the sale or other disposition
of assets statute, id. § 1701.76(A)(1)(a), and the merger statute, id. § 1701.78(D) (West 1994).
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14a-8 proposals are routinely brought as precatory proposals even
with respect to Ohio corporations.
In my view, the potential to bring binding shareholder proposals in
Ohio is a corporate outgrowth of the Progressive political movement,
the wave of governmental reform that had its highpoint in the early
1900s as the backdrop behind the Ohio Constitutional Convention of
1912,1"1 which authorized Ohio's voter-driven initiative and
referendum." 6 Ohio's corporate code was modernized in 1926, and
the current statutes maintain the fundamental philosophical approach
of the earlier era'1 17 Despite the Ohio rule's uniqueness, I don't think
it is strange at all that a state that allows its citizens to directly amend
its constitution by initiative and override the legislature by
referendum would have a corporate law that allows shareholders to
directly amend the articles of incorporation. The possibility of nonprecatory, binding proposals is equivalent to the power of citizens to
bring direct proposals to the ballot.
Even so, there have been few, if any, binding proposals brought.
Interestingly, this may be in part because most corporate practitioners
and institutions may be ignorant of the law. But in a state where
binding proposals are possible, the threat that such a proposal could
happen should increase the impact at the Board level of those
precatory proposals that are brought and that receive significant levels
of support. If a majority of the shareholders support an institution's
request that the Board consider de-classification of the Board, then
the ability of a shareholder to change that request next time into a
binding proposal may well cause a Board to be less able to simply
ignore the shareholders' wishes. Corporate governance lawyers who
recognize this threat counsel their clients accordingly.
Now let me illustrate, through two scenarios, the impact of Rule
14a-8 proposals on corporate behavior. In Scenario A, a religiousaffiliated organization brings a substantive proposal that the Board
take steps to cause the corporation to withdraw its business operations
from a nation that is using police state methods to squash the freedom
of religion and discriminate against a religious minority. This is a
substantive corporate governance proposal, in that it would lead to a
change in corporate activity. In Scenario B, a union pension fund
5

See STEvEN H. STEiNGLAss & GINO J. SCARSELLI, THE OHIO STATE CONSTITUTrION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE 2 (2004) (discussing the Convention's growth from the Progressive
movement that dominated the politics of the period).
1160OHIO CONST. art. 2, § 1 (giving voters power to propose laws and constitutional
amendments to the General Assembly, and allowing them to adopt or reject such proposals on a
referendum vote).
7
11 Ballantine, supra note 61, at n. 1; Shipmian, supra note 32, at 518.
11
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brings a procedural proposal that the Board take action to cause the
charter/bylaws of the corporation to be amended to require that,
except in contested elections, all director candidates receive a
majority of the votes cast in order to be elected as a director, and that
the term of any director not re-elected under that standard be ended.
This is a procedural corporate governance proposal, not directly
effecting any change in itself, but setting up an electoral process that
could, in the future, result in a substantive change.
In my experience, the substantive governance proposal in Scenario
A, despite the most fervent wishes of its proponents, is relatively
unlikely to directly cause any significant change in corporate
behavior. Even if many shareholders support the proposal, it is
unlikely that the corporation will drop a profitable business to
appease those shareholders. This does not mean that the corporation
will not expend resources to quash the proposal. Rather, the corporate
officers (and less commonly, the Board) may feel that they need to
fight the shareholder proposal, even though they know it will have no
direct impact on the corporation's behavior, because the real war is to
influence the governmental bodies that could actually affect the
corporation's activities through regulation on the issue.
So while every proxy season involves outside lawyers advising
clients on how to respond to shareholder proposals, those of the
Scenario A variety rarely result in any deep thinking at the Board
level, and even more rarely cause serious debate in the boardroom,
much less change corporate behavior. These largely symbolic
proposals don't hit Yellow on the corporate threat scale.
In contrast, the procedural proposal in Scenario B does not directly
affect the corporation's day-to-day operations or strategy, but is
aimed squarely at the Board, potentially setting up a later change in
Board membership, and therefore the corporation's direction. It is
obviously the kind of measure that could be viewed as extremely
threatening by the directors. After all, notwithstanding that every
director in the history of virtually every corporation in America has
always received enough votes to be elected under the majority voting
standard,' 18 there is the threat that, someday, one of the Board's
members will fail to get the necessary votes. As discussed below, this
threat may be heightened through the changes in broker discretionary
I's n 2007, only thirty-five directors received a majority "withhold" vote and only one
director (at Gen-Probe, Inc.) failed to receive a required majority vote. Through October
2008 only thirty-seven directors had received a majority withhold vote. QulINTON
HUCKEBY, PROXY GOVERNANCE, INC., ELECTIONS THAT MATTER: A REVIEW OF DIRECTOR
VOTS IN 2008, at 1, 3 (2008), http://www.directorsandboards.com/DBEBRIEFING/
November2008/A-ReviewoffirectorVotesin2OO8FfNAL.pdf.
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voting rules now underway at the New York Stock Exchange. As a
result of this risk some corporations faced with such a proposal may
fight the Scenario B proposal tooth-and-nail.
But many other corporations will acquiesce to the proposal, letting
the matter go to the shareholders for a vote on the institutional
proposal, or even going so far as adopting the proposal's position and
making it effective through Board-recommended proposals. This
occurs when the Board and its advisors either do not see a viable
argument against the logic behind majority voting standards, or do not
see enough risk to the sitting directors to make them want to fight. As
discussed further below, the likelihood of a negotiated settlement is
increased if the Board is aware that proxy voting advisory services are
likely to recommend a "yes" vote for the shareholder proposal. I rate
these sorts of proposals as being a Yellow, and possibly even an
Orange, on the corporate threat scale, since the Board, especially the
Nominating/Corporate Governance Committee, will weigh in on the
measures and debate them internally.
Some Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposals can actually have a
profound effect on corporate governance and even corporate law. For
example, consider the activity that led to Ohio's recent statutory
accommodation of majority voting standards for the election of
directors of Ohio corporations. I had a major hand, through my work
with the Ohio State Bar Association's Corporation Law Committee,
in pushing through the change to Ohio's corporation law to clarify
that the shareholders could decide that directors must receive a
majority vote to be elected. The majority vote movement had gained
steam throughout the United States, 119 but here in Ohio we had a
problem: at least some Ohio lawyers were of the view that the
plurality standard then included in section 1701.55 of the Ohio
Revised Code could not be interpreted as being subject to the
provisions of section 1701.52 that enable shareholders to adopt a
"different proportion" such as a majority. 120 So clarification was
appropriate, and a simple amendment to section 1701.55 was
9
11
See Hearing on I-LB. 134 Before the Subcommn. on Civil Justice of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 2007 Leg., 127th Sess. (Ohio 2007) (on file with The Case Western Reserve Law
Review) [hereinafter Porter Testimony] (testimony of David Porter). For an interesting article
discussing the majority voting reform movement and concluding that it is nothing more than
"smoke and mirrors," creating an image of reform but resulting in no real change, see William
K. Sjostrom, Jr. & Young Sang Kim, Majority Voting for the Election of Directors, 40 Conn L.
Rev. 459 (2007).
' 20 See, for example, Letter from Thompson Hine LLP to Mr. C. Thomas Harvie (Nov. 2 1,
2005) (attached to Letter from Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company to Securities and Exchange
Commission (Nov. 30, 2005)), available at 2006 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 68, requesting no-action
relief for Goodyear's proposed exclusion of a shareholder proposal relating to majority voting.
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processed in the ordinary course through the Ohio State Bar
Association machinery and a sponsor found in the Legislature. As far
as I know, there was no opposition to this amendment when it was
introduced as House Bill 134 and enacted in 2007. 12 ' At that time,
Ohio was the last state to clarify or adopt legislation to permit such
election standards, and it was very easy, when testifying before
legislative committees in Columbus, to give reasons to the legislators
why they should support the bill. 122 1 found that politicians, who are
generally elected by plurality voting standards in contested elections,
but who are also well aware how incredibly lucky they are if they can
run unopposed, quickly grasped the absurdity that a director is, under
the plurality voting systems in the uncontested elections that represent
virtually all corporate elections, guaranteed election through voting
his own shares for himself. Given the atmosphere created by Enron
and its kin, legislators were not inclined to be overly sympathetic to
entrenched directors, and they understood that there ought to be some
way to oust a bad director short of a full-blown proxy fight. And the
change was very appropriate given Ohio's historically progressive
past and our state's general philosophy toward shareholder
23
democracy as discussed above.1
Our efforts to change Ohio's law were given a gigantic boost by
the Rule 14a-8 proposals being contemporaneously made by union
pension funds, which asked Boards of nearly a dozen Ohio public
companies to consider reincorporation to Delaware simply to enable
adoption of majority voting standards by the shareholders.124 Only
three of these proposals actually went to the shareholders,125 as the
remaining corporations were easily able to dissuade the proponent
from proceeding with their proposal by the corporation's assurances
that they supported, or at least did not oppose, our pending legislative
efforts to clarify the statutes. Of the three proposals that went to
121H.B.
134, 127th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2007), available at
http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/bills.cfm?ID=127_HB-134.
22
1 See Porter Testimony, supra note 119.
2
' 1See supra text accompanying notes 115-16.
24
1 See Porter Testimony, supra note 119.
121Convergys Corporation, DPL Inc., and FirstEnergy Corporation each presented
the re-incorporation issue to their shareholders in their 2007 annual meeting proxy
statements. Convergys Corp., Notice of Annual Meeting and Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A),
at
59
(March
8,
2007),
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data
/ 1062047/0001 19312507053 163/ddefl 4a.htm#toc5 871 515;
DPL
Inc.,
Notice
of
Annual Meeting of Shareholders April 27, 2007 and Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A),
at 49 (March
15, 2007),
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data
/787250/0001 10465907018294/a07-6286_ldefl4a.htm:; FirstEnergy Corp., Notice of Annual
Meeting of Shareholders and Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 21 (Apr. 2, 2007),
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1031296/0001 10465907024558/a077408 ldefl4a.htm#ItemsToBeVotedOn_044610.
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shareholders, one actually garnered majority support," which gave
me particularly powerful ammunition in my testimony to the
Legislative committees considering HB 134. Since I was already a
proponent for the clarification, I viewed this particular use of Rule
14a-8 as a very positive application of shareholder power to facilitate
shareholder democracy. Despite the fact that their actual proposal (to
reincorporate to Delaware) was highly repugnant to me (and an unfair
cost to the targeted companies, who after all were not the cause of the
identified problem, but innocent victims of a quirk in how a statute
had been drafted), I would call that institutional shareholder a "hero."
While I support majority voting standards as a concept of good
governance and shareholder democracy, I see a troubling dark side,
which will be exacerbated by the points I discuss in the next topic.
That dark side is that the real threat of removal of directors on an
annual basis may create a dramatic shift from today's world, in which
directors, once elected, are virtually assured of a very long tenure. An
important and good aspect of long tenure is that the director is
motivated to take the long-term view, as she knows that she will be
dealing with the fallout from any short-term actions that aren't well
thought through. It is my belief, shaped by my experiences in
practice, that an undue focus on short-term strategies will usually
result in poor strategies and outcome for the long-term. While the
long-term view is more obviously protected by classified boards
where board terms run for two or three years, which emphasizes a
longer time horizon, today's directors are, by dint of their relatively
guaranteed re-election, encouraged to take the long-view even in
corporations that have annual elections for all directors.
But once majority voting policies are put in place, if the directors
perceive there to be a significant risk that the director can't count on
re-election, the director's current long-term outlook may well switch
to "how do I get re-elected next year?" Although I suspect that
is exactly what some shareholders want to hear, it is, in my view, a
very poor outcome. We all recognize this re-election campaign
phenomenon from politics; the Founding Fathers sought to offset this
126 Shareholders at DPL Inc. and FirstEnergy Inc. turned down the proposals at those
companies, but 58 percent of the shareholders at Convergys Corporation voted in favor of that
proposal. See Convergys Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 38 (May 8, 2007),
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1062047/000l119312507106131l/dl~q.htmn
(specifically Item 4(d)); DPL Inc., Quarterly Report (Form I0-Q), at 60 (July 26, 2007),
available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/27430/0001 104659070565 80/a0718742_1 lq.htm#ltem4SubniissionOfMattersToAVoteOf 182930]
(specifically Item 4);
FirstEnergy Corp., Quarterly Report (Form l0-Q), at 135 (Aug. 7, 2007), available
at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/20947/000103 129607000167/main l0q.htmn
(specifically Item 4(c)(iii)).
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risk to our national government by longer terms, especially for
Senators.12 7 1 must ask why we would ever want such short-term
mentality to fill our boardrooms. Unfortunately, the combination of
majority voting standards and annual board terms, when mixed with
the unregulated clout of the proxy advisory services firms I discuss
below, could lead to serious negative consequences for long-term
thinking.
C The Impact of ISS/RiskMetrics and the PotentiallyHuge Impact of
the Eliminationof Broker Discretionary Voting
Before leaving the subject of Rule 14a-8 proposals, it is important
to discuss the impact of proxy advisory services firms such as
RiskMetrics Group, Inc. (which acquired Institutional Shareholder
Services (ISS) in 2007), 128 Glass Lewis & Co., LLC, and Proxy
Governance, Inc. on Board receptivity and response to shareholder
proposals. To sum it up, in my experience there is a huge impact, and
the rise in influence of these "advisors," especially of RiskMetrics
(the most prominent of the proxy advisory services firms), cannot be
overstated. I place quotes about the word "advisor" as their real role
in many cases is absolute and determinative, rather than merely
advisory. That's because, for many corporations, it is common
wisdom that a majority of their institutional shareholders will follow
the advisor's recommendations slavishly, and so the outcome of the
shareholder proposal may well be determined by what position
RiskMetrics has taken on the matter. 129 In the view of many
2

1 7 As

stated by Alexander Hamilton:

The mutability in the public councils, arising from a rapid succession of new
members, however qualified they may be, points out, in the strongest manner, the
necessity of some stable institution in the Government. Every new election in the
States, is found to change one-half of the representatives. From this change of men
must proceed a change of opinions; and from a change of opinions, a change of
measures. But a continual change even of good measures is inconsistent with every
rule of prudence, and every prospect of success. The remark is verified in private
life, and becomes more just, as well as more important, in national transactions.
THE FEDERALIST
No. 62, at 343 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898).
28
1 RiskMetrics Group, Company History, http://www.riskmetrics.com/history (last visited
June 27,
2009).
129 See generally 2009 Proxy Season Update: RiskMetrics FAQs Regarding Updated 2009
Compensation Policies, JONES DAY COMMENT (Jones Day, New York, N.Y.), Jan. 2009,
http://www.jonesday.com/pubs/Pubs-detail.aspx?pubD-=S5841 (discussing the influence of
RiskMetrics and its stances on a few specific proxy provisions); RiskMetrics Group Releases
2009 Proxy Voting Policies, LEGAL NEWS ALERT (Foley & Lardner LLP, Chicago, 1ll.), Jan.
2009. http://www.foley.com/abe.aspx?Publication=5561
(noting institutional investors'
adherence to RiskMetrics voting recommendations and outlining the significant
recommendations for 2009). But ef Bill Baue, Correlating Proxy Advisory Firm
Recommendations with
Voting Results,
SociALFuNDS.com,
June
20, 2006,
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practitioners, if the proxy advisory services firms have taken a "vote
yes" position, it will pass, and a "vote no" position means it will fail.
It's a corporate equivalent of citizens voting the way a party or
political advocacy group tells you to vote. Of course, there is another
corporate example of voting the straight party line: voting as the
directors suggest! I would suggest that neither approach is very
thoughtful.
A key factor to understanding why advisory firms are so powerful
is that, at least based on my clients' experience, and as Mr. Wilcox
confirmed to me during a break in the Symposium was also his
experience, many ordinary institutions separate their voting decision
making from their investment decision making. 130 This means that the
investment analysts that management so assiduously court through
their investor relations efforts are most likely useless in affecting the
outcome.' 3' It can be an almost schizophrenic behavior. On the one
hand, the stock analyst rates the company (and presumably its
management) a "buy," while the investor votes against management
because that's what RiskMetrics said to do!
So the impact of RiskMetrics's recommendations is already very
significant. In Scenario B above, if the Board knows that the chance
of a majority "yes" vote is almost certain due to the RiskMetrics
position on the topic, it greatly increases the likelihood that the matter
will be negotiated away through discussions with the proponent. Why
fight a losing battle over something that is not an immediate threat to
the Board?
This already significant power of proxy advisory services may be
enormously increased as the New York Stock Exchange goes ahead
with its plans to eliminate broker discretion. 132 Currently, brokers are
empowered by NYSE rules to vote proxies for the retail accounts that
they oversee without receiving direction from the beneficial owners
of those accounts.13 3 The rule change will, for shareholder meetings

http://www.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi/2037.html (discussing the lack of studies on
correlation of voting recommendations versus outcomes).
130Fra description of how institutional investors vote their proxies, see Stephen Davis &
Jon Lukonik, New Era of Investing Could Change "Factory Style" Proxy Voting,
COMPLIANCE WK., Jan. 2006, at 72.
131Id.

132SeNotice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Eliminate Broker Discretionary
Voting for the Election of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 59,464, 74 Fed. Reg. 9,864
(Feb. 26, 2009). The SEC has approved this rule change, see Order Approving Proposed Rule
Change to Amend NYSE Rule 452 to Eliminate Broker Discretionary Voting for the Election of
Directors and Material Amendments to Investment Advisory Contracts with an Investment
Company, Exchange Act Release No. 34-60215, 74 Fed. Reg. 33,293 (July 10, 2009).
133NYSE,
Inc.,
Rule
452
(2009),
available at
http://rules.nyse.com/
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held on or after January 1, 2010, terminate that authority and leave
34
shares for which no direction is received as "broker non-votes."
Objections to this proposal were well laid out in a comment
letter from the Society of Corporate Secretaries & Governance
Professionals 135 and in commentary by David Katz and Laura
McIntosh of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz.13 6 In summary, brokers
today vote heavily in favor of incumbent directors, but do so without
receiving direction to do so from their customers, many of whom
ignore requests for instruction.137 In contrast, most institutions-the
shareholders most likely to be responsive to the proxy advisory
services firm recommendations-do give directions on how to vote,
using electronic voting systems. By removing the bulk of brokerage
accounts from the votes cast column, institutions have more weight,
13 8
which then increases the influence of the proxy advisory services.
Despite this impending rule change, we should not expect a change
in shareholder voting behavior. Small holders will still not give
directions on how to vote, and large holders will still rely on their
proxy advisors and will give voting instructions to their nominee
holders. This will magnify the voting power of the institutions and the
impact of RiskMetrics and its competitors and could, for example,
mean that "withhold the vote" campaigns against directors could

nysetoolslExchangeviewer.asp?SelectedNode=chpl1_5&manual-/nyse/nyse-rues/nyse-rules/.
134See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Eliminate Broker Discretionary
Voting for the Election of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 34-59464, 74 Fed. Reg. 9,864,
9,864 (Feb. 26, 2009).
135Letter from Neila B. Radin, Chair, Securities Law Comm., 5oc'y of Corporate
Secretaries and Governance Prof Is, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, SEC, (Mar. 20, 2009),
available at www.govemnanceprofessionals.org/Document.asp?DoclD= 1557&SnID-2.
136David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Activist Shareholders Would Gain Powerfrm
Proposed Rule, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 26, 2009, at 5.
137Id (noting that broker discretionary votes have historically been in favor of incumbent
directors, which consequently appear to represent the views of retail shareholders despite their
lack of input).
138 o much additional influence the services will have will depend heavily on the mix of
ownership at the corporation and whether the institutional ownership do their own analyses or
rely on the advisor. To use one example, statistics at Yahoo Finance on April 13, 2009 showed
Procter & Gamble had a 60 percent institutional shareholder base (this is lower than many
companies, probably because P&G has been a mainstay of retail accounts for decades).
Assuming there was a majority vote election standard in place and a RiskMetrics supported
"withhold the vote" campaign targeted a director, achieving 70 percent withheld at institutions
but only 15 percent at retail, then under the current broker discretion rules, assuming 95 percent
voting by both institutions and retail, the director would win election with 52 percent of the
votes cast. If the brokers lack discretion, it requires only a tiny reduction in the votes cast to
result in a loss of the necessary majority support. For a detailed examination of this issue,
see the report published July 14, 2009 by the proxy solicitation firm Georgeson,
Georegeson Report, SEC Approves Elimination of Broker DiscretionaryVoting in Uncontested
Director Elections,
July
14,
2009,
http://www.georgesonshareholder.com/usa/
download/georgeson-report07O9.html.
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greatly increase the risk that targeted directors are not re-elected
under majority-vote standards. 139 In extreme cases, the result may
even be a failure of corporations to meet their quorum requirements,
potentially costing money to hold a second meeting. 14 0 These
potential outcomes also heighten my earlier concern about directors
taking on a short-term orientation.
The proxy advisory firms' clout is also seen on Board-generated
proposals. Here, good planning requires the corporation and its
counsel to reach out to RiskMetrics, and perhaps the two smaller
firms, to vet management's own draft proposals before finalizing
them. While this is most prevalent in executive compensation
proposals that may require close analysis under RiskMetrics'
guidelines, I have seen the same tactics used in broader corporate
governance proposals, especially in potential takeover scenarios. By
following this path, the corporation assures itself that the measure will
be adopted, or, if adoption appears unlikely, it can make alternative
plans.
D. The InstitutionalInvestor as a Noodge: Jawboning Management
Institutional shareholders do not limit themselves to making Rule
14a-8 proposals. Even those that don't plan to take any stronger
measures know how to use the telephone or write letters to try to
influence management. These "jawboning" contacts14 1 are different
from the more common investment-oriented calls to check up on how
business is doing.142 In many cases, such a letter (and less often a call)
comes some months before the due date for Rule 14a-8 proposals, and
is merely the groundwork that comes before a formal proposal. These
communications fall within my discussion of those proposals above.
But sometimes the shareholder crosses over from matters that are
potential grist for the 14a-8 proposal mill to "suggestions" that clearly
infringe on the Board's traditional turf, such as proposals
recommending a change in dividend policy, or consideration of a
stock buyback, or a mergers and acquisition opportunity. This sort of
substantive approach by an institutional investor triggers a very

39

1 In 2008, an additional eighteen directors would likely have failed to receive majority
support. HUCKaBY, supra note 118, at 4.
140
See Letter from Neila B. Radin, Chair, Securities Law Comm., Soc'y of Corporate
Secretaries and Governance Prof'ls, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, SEC, supra note 135, at 3-

4.

141BLAIR,
4

supra note 12, at 75.

12MI. at 162-63 (discussing a particular fund manager's practice of closely following

companies and calling management regularly).
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different response by management and the Board than the more lowkey Rule 14a-8-type activity.
The analysis begins with looking at the identity of the investor and
how many shares he or she owns. I find that the company's response
to the approach differs greatly depending on the answers to those two
questions. If the investor is a small holder, and not an obvious threat
for greater activity (that is, not Carl Icahn, Phil Falcone, or another of
that sort), management generally will be courteous and listen, say
"thank you for your ideas," and do no more. Rate this as still Green or
Blue on the corporate threat scale. Corporate lawyers may never even
hear about these calls, and the Board likewise probably isn't
43

informed.1

If, instead, the holder is one of the corporation's largest long term
holders, someone the corporation has courted for years, or most
importantly, someone with holdings above the 5 percent ownership
level that triggers reporting under sections 13(d)144 or 13 (g) 145 of the
Securities Exchange Act, then in my experience the response will be
taken much more seriously, rating at least a Yellow on the corporate
threat scale. In these circumstances, corporate governance lawyers
should be involved, the full Board should hear about the proposal and
discuss responses, and the management should take great care to
demonstrate their thoughtful consideration of the idea. Assuming the
Board already had thought about the question, it may well want to say
that to the holder, being ever mindful of Regulation FD 146 strictures
on selective disclosure as they do so. Will the Board ultimately do
143'Although perhaps they should be at least kept apprised of the communications.
Shareholders do not have a fundamental right to meet with or even communicate to directors.
However, good corporate governance practices routinely include ways for directors to hear from
all of their constituents. Public companies subject to the rules of the New York Stock Exchange
are required to disclose a method for interested parties (not just shareholders) to communicate
directly with the presiding director or with the non-management directors as a group. See NYSE
LtSTED COMPANY MANUAL 1303A.03 (2009), available at http://nysemanual.nyse.coml
LCMToolslPlatformViewer.asp?selectednodechp%/5F%/5F4&manual=/
2Fcm%/2Fsections
%2Flcm%/2Dsections%2F.
144Securities Exchange Act § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2006), and the rules promulgated
thereunder, General Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. §§
240.13d-1-.13d-7, 240.13d-101 (2009). A shareholder who is obligated to file a Form 13D
under these rules has enhanced disclosure obligations.
'45Securities Exchange Act § 13(g), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(g) (2006), and the rules promulgated
thereunder, General Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. §§
240.13d-1 .13d-7, 240.13d-102 (2009). A shareholder who files a Schedule 13G pursuant to
these rules has limited disclosure obligations, but may, by changing their investment intent,
trigger the enhanced disclosures required in Schedule 13D filings.
146Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243 (2008), prohibits public companies from making
selective disclosure to investors about material matters. See also Selective Disclosure and
Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7881, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154,
Investment Company Act Release No. 24,599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) (detailing
the purpose and effect of the regulation).
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what the large holder wants? Probably not, but at least they will have
thought long and hard about it. And sometimes, circumstances later
change so that the Board actually does adopt the action supported by
the institutional investor, and perhaps does so a little faster than if the
shareholder hadn't spoken up.
But what if the shareholder goes beyond jawboning? What if
management and the Board don't appear to be acting in a thoughtful
and informed manner? Cue the hedge fund attack.
E. Aggressive Measures- "Hedge Fund Attacks"
It is every public company Board's nightmare147 that some
aggressive-minded shareholder will decide their company is worthy
of attention. Such action puts the directors on the hot seat more than
anything short of a takeover battle (which at least has some fairly
well-established rules) or the decision to enter into bankruptcy (which
is usually so compelling a choice that there is, in the end, not as much
trauma as might be supposed). Usually the aggressive shareholder's
attention does not occur because of a failure in procedural corporate
governance or because of a failure to treat a large holder with
respect. Most aggressive shareholders do not go to war over such
matters-meaning they don't spend a lot of their time and resources.
Instead, the most aggressive shareholders choose their targets with a
different goal: increasing the value of their investment portfolio
through aggressive means.
When I speak of aggressive shareholders, I am speaking of hedge
funds (another ill-defined term!)1 48 or other institutional investors that
look at corporate governance as simply another of the tools that can
be used along with other tactics, such as short selling, to maximize
the value of their portfolio investments. These are not shareholders
interested in globally maximizing good governance; you'll find no
high-minded CaIPERS or TIAA-CREF here.
It's my belief that aggressive shareholders, like predators hunting
prey,149 usually target weakened companies, meaning companies that
147There is no limitation on the type or size of company that may draw the interest of an
aggressive-minded shareholder, We know from assaults on companies such as Target, General
Motors, and McDonald's that a marquee name or large size is no protection.
14 n writer says that a hedge fund "is generally described by what it is not. Generally a
hedge fund is one of several categories of investment vehicles that holds a pool of securities and
perhaps other assets, does not register its securities offerings under the Securities Act, and is not
registered as an investment company under the Investment Company Act." MONKS & MINOW,
supra note 16, at 197. Another writer says, "hedge funds resist one-line definition." William W.
Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Target, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1382 (2007).
149
The investor relations firm ICR published a white paper in May 2008 in which it
divided shareholder activists into three categories: (1) "sharks," that are "primarily dedicated to
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are perceived to have operational or strategic difficulties, and
therefore have stock prices that lag their industry. Sample targets are
companies that have suffered recurring declines in business or profits,
companies that seem to have lost their way in an industry
repositioning, companies that continue to operate a diversified
conglomerate despite Wall Street's preference for single industry
stocks, and companies that hold onto stale businesses or failing
business units that seemingly sap their energy. 50 These targets are no
different from most of the targets of the famed corporate raiders of
the 1980Os, and in many ways hedge funds are merely the twenty-first
century version of T. Boone Pickens, Sir James Goldsmith, Robert
Bass, Nelson Peitz, Carl Icahn, and their like.'
it should be no
surprise then that those old-hands Peitz152 and Icahn' 53 today play in
the new hedge fund game.
William Bratton, in his 2007 article Hedge Funds and Governance
Targets, identifies four ways a hedge fund can direct its influence to
get an immediate return on investment.15 4 First, get the target to sell
itself at a premium to a third party,155 which hands immediate cash
return to shareholders. Second, get the target to sell or spin off a
significant asset,156 liberating cash or an asset for the shareholders.
Third, get the target to pay out existing spare cash,157 which, again,
provides instant return to the shareholders. Bratton identifies these
three as the easy means. His fourth option, getting the target to
change its long-term business plan,' 5 8 is clearly more difficult for the
market to value.

activist investing"; (2) "wolves," that "typically choose to either follow others or act in concert
with other investors"; and (3) "jaguars," that "never call themselves 'activists' but nonetheless
still sometimes take overt and aggressive positions relative to management or the board." 1CR
INC., SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM: PROAcTivE DEFENSE ANT) INFORMED RESPONSE 2 (2008),
availableat http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/files/2008/05/shareholderactivism.pdf.
15 o a description of the activities of hedge funds, see Mara der Hovanesian, Attack of
the Hungry Hedge Funds, Bus. WK., Feb. 20, 2006, at 72, 72-73.
151See CONNIE BRUCK, THE PREDATOR'S BALL: THE INSIDE STORY OF DREXEL BURNHAM
AND THE RISE OF THE JUNK BOND RAIDERS (Penguin Books 1989); Leslie Wane, Takeovers

Revert to the Old Mode, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1988, at Dl; see also Wikipedia.org, Corporate
raid, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corporate -raid (last visited July 20, 2009).
12Fra description of Nelson Peltz's activities with Heinz Corporation and a comparison
of his behavioral approach to Carl Icahn's, see Shawn Tully, The Reinvention of Nelson Peltz,
FORTUNE, Apr. 2, 2007, at 76, 78-79.
"53See Andy Serwer, CarlIcahn 's New Life as a Hedge Fund Manager, FORTUNE, Nov.
29, 2004, at 79 (describing Carl Icahn's forays into the hedge fund business).
114Bratton, supra note 148, at 1390.
155Id
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Bratton's list is consistent with my experience, save one additional
form: some hedge funds may cross the hazily marked line between
hedge fund and private equity fund, and actually intend to put the
target together with other portfolio companies in order to flip both out
as a larger, more valuable entity. So the hedge fund starts by looking
for a target that will yield a fast return. Another factor that attracts
hedge fund attacks is an existing base of disgruntled institutional
shareholders, who, while they won't start the attack themselves, are
happy to tag along (and perhaps even instigate) the attacks. A
corporation's shareholder profile that holds the opportunity for a
"6wolf pack" approach 5 9 increases the potential threat level of the
jawboning investor described above.
Once the target is identified, the hedge fund looks for weaknesses
that it can exploit in order to exert pressure on the target's Board.
Often, these are perceived procedural corporate governance
weaknesses, such as having in place defensive bulwarks like
staggered boards or poison pills, which are viewed negatively by
proxy advisory services firms and many institutional shareholders as
precluding takeover bids and thereby depressing stock market
values.16 0 The hedge funds can then mount an attack on these
perceived procedural corporate governance weaknesses as a prelude
to a substantive corporate governance attack using the proxy rules to
replace a minority of the directors. The plan normally is not to seize
absolute control of the corporation, as that may trigger all sorts of
corporate and state anti-takeover defenses, and, perhaps as
importantly, cause investors to evaluate the bona fides of the
insurgents. Rather, the aim is to make enough of a play so as to
invade the boardroom and alter the corporation's policies, or (more
simply and cynically) to at least make it appear that this is their goal.
And if a third party strategic bidder appears on the scene and offers a
premium for control, so much the better. The hedge fund will gladly
pocket its dollars and move on.
Why do I make this latter point? Because better corporate
governance (procedural or substantive) is not really a goal of the
exercise. Instead, the hedge fund's goal is to persuade the market to
increase the share price to a point that enriches the hedge fund. If that
9

5 In

a "wolf pack"'

attack, first one hedge fund announces a position in a company, then

others follow. Id at 1379.
160See, e. g., RiSKMETRICS GROUP, 2009 POISON PILL POLICY FAQ (Apr. 10, 2009),
http://www.riskmetrics com/policy/2009_poisonpill-FAQ. RiskMetrics will advise for a vote
against an attempt to classify' an unclassified Board or for an attempt to de-classify' a Board. See
RISKMETRics GROUP, 2009 U.S. PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES SUMMARY 12 (DEC. 24, 2008),
http://www.riskmetrics.com/sites/default/files/RMG2009SummaryGuidelinesUnitedStates.pdf.
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can be achieved without actually improving the target's corporate
61
governance, that's okay for the hedge fund. Short-term dollar gains,1
62
not long-term governance, are what are at stake.'1 The aggressive
shareholder knows (as does the proxy advisor and counsel for the
defense) that most institutional shareholders will be willing to support
the insurgency so long as it doesn't actually threaten a change in
control. RiskMetrics and other proxy voting advisors usually will not
oppose the "less than a majority change" that seemingly leaves any
control premium in the hands of the current shareholders. Thus, the
insurgent moves to replace all of the directors of a single class, or
one-third of the full board, rather than all of the directors.
One phenomenon that adds mystery to these battles is the issue of
who gets to vote. The hedge fund that brings the proposal is largely
motivated, as I have said, by the prospect that the campaign will
cause an uptick in the company's share price. Rarely will the fund
really want to be firmly committed to a long-term ownership position,
unless it is with an eye to a subsequent change-in-control transaction
that will yield a potentially even greater prize. But the short term
uptick may well occur in advance of the vote actually being taken. At
that point, as the campaign has achieved its goal and maximized the
hedge fuind's investment and the fund faces risk from continued
ownership, prudence would dictate that the hedge fund should sell its
shares, take its profit, and move its investments elsewhere. This point
may very well occur between the record date for the vote and the date
of the shareholder meeting, in which case the fund might actually no
longer own any shares, or have sold the economic interest in the
shares and retained only the voting power! This "empty-voting"
distorts the economic reality.16 3 A hit and run "investor" is, in my
161See Bratton, supra note 148, at 1379 (discussing hedge funds' bias toward short term
gains); see also id at 1383-84 (noting the short-term commitments of the hedge fund's own
investors).
162In this respect, some hedge funds ape the greenmail tactics of the 1980s; the difference
is that greenmail is today difficult to extract from wary directors, or even illegal under state law.
See generally ThompsonHine.com, Hedge Funds: Greenmail Disgorgement Statutes and
Corporate By-Law Provisions Could Trap Activist Hedge Funds (Mar. 12, 2009),
http://www.thompsonhine.com/publications/publicationl732.htmfl.
63
1 For a fascinating example of hedge funds fighting one another, see High River L.P. v.
Mylan Labs., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 2d 487 (M.D. Pa. 2005). Carl Icahn, who was involved in the
battle, wrote a letter in which he excoriated another hedge fund for having hedged its position in
Icahn's target:

On Monday, Perry Capital disclosed in a filing with the Securities and Exchange
Commission that it has hedged its Mylan shares, apparently confirming earlier
reports that Perry may have had no economic interest in Mylan. merely the right to
vote those shares. If this is true, in our opinion, this so-called innovative maneuver is
co-opting the election process and robbing shareholders of the right to have a
meaningful vote.
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books, nothing more than a speculator, and, thus, it is hard for me to
cast such a person as a "hero." Such a person is, for me, far more
likely to be a "villain."
But many of these contests never make it as far as the actual proxy
battle. Thus, Bratton reported a number of targets that have put
themselves up for sale, 164 unbundled "conglomerate" assets, 15or
bought back shares using excess cash. 166 As he demonstrated, Boards
will often accede to the request of the insurgent by adopting the
insurgent's plan or putting some of the insurgent's proposed members
on the Board. 167 Although some insurgents later become valued and
trusted members of the Board, initially there is likely to be some
disruption in Board dynamics and collegiality.
One facet of interest to the corporate lawyer is the lack of effective
legal defenses to hedge fund attacks at the state law level. This is
because the attacks take advantage of the modem nominee ownership
system and so evade corporation statutes that focus on record
ownership. 168 The corporate takeover world, in contrast, has seen
many effective statutory schemes developed to provide some level of
protection against midnight raid tender offers or greenmail
attempts.16 9 1 have helped legislate and defend in litigation some of
Ohio's efforts in this regard, 17 0 but to date I have not seen any state
able to formulate effective protective legislation in the hedge fund
attack area. The reason for this is not that the states, especially
constituency states like Ohio, don't care. The reason for inactivity is

Corporate democracy is a cornerstone of our capitalist system. A few hedge funds
should not be permitted to destroy it in order to make a few extra bucks.
Mylan Labs. Inc., Additional Definitive Proxy Soliciting Materials Filed by Non-management
(Form DFAN14A) (Dec. 6, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgarf
data/69499/000092847504000084/Proxydec6.txt.
16 4
Bratton, supra note 148, at 139 1.
1

65ld

at 1392-94.

166 1d. at 1380.

167ld. at 1405-09.
168Fo example, Ohio's corporation

law focuses entirely on shareholders of record;
"shareholder" as used in chapter 1701 of the Ohio Revised Code means "a person whose name
appears on the books of the corporation as the owner of the shares." OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §
170 1.01 (F) (West Supp. 2009).
169Fra description of Ohio's statutory defense scheme, see Geyer, supra note 66.
70
1 For example, see the description of the 1996 battles over the constitutionality of Ohio's
Control Share Acquisition Act involving first Acme-Cleveland Corp. and later Commercial
Intertech Corp. contained in Geyer, supra note 66, at 533-40. As noted in that article, while the
court upheld the statute's constitutionality, the legislature nevertheless amended the statute to
eliminate some of the provisions that the judge had struggled with in reaching his conclusion.
Ohio's legislature later adopted additional amendments to the Control Share Acquisition Act as
a result of litigation in 2002 involving TRW Inc. Porter, supra note 1, at 182.
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that the basic ownership system for shares has developed beyond the
comprehension of state laws, through market derivatives and other
7
methods that, in effect, create the problems of "empty voting."4 1
Until new statutory schemes are developed, and so long as the
aggressors dot their current corporate law Is and cross their current
securities laws Ts, aggressive hedge fund tactics appear destined for
very little new legislative restrictions. The best that corporate defense
lawyers have come up with to take care of "empty voting" issues is
tightening their clients' notice bylaw requirements or creating record
dates for voting that are closer to the time of the actual vote. For
newly public companies, the best defense is dual class capitalization,
vesting majority voting control in thle founding shareholder or his or
her family. Dual class capitalization is already in place at some family
or founder dominated companies, which is a huge advantage in

dealing with hedge funds. 172

If one can ever look at these hedge fund attacks as a social
positive, it is because they in some cases do act like maggots that
doctors use to eat away diseased flesh,173 leaving a cleansed and
healthier corporation behind them. Of course the hedge fund raiders
would claim this is their goal in every attack. That would mean some
observers could rank these attackers in the "hero" category, at least
when the target is truly underperforming.
On the negative side, however, these attacks are dangerous threats
to any corporation, even well run ones, as there are relatively few real
defenses that the corporation can raise against them. Obviously, the
best way to avoid such hedge funds or other aggressive shareholders
is to outperform the market, or at least your peer group. But a
71
1 See generally Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable)
Ownership: Taxonomy, Implications and Reform, 61 Bus. LAW. 10 11 (2006) (discussing the
hedge fund practice of buying votes so as to have substantial voting power with little or no
economic ownership and its implications on corporate governance), Marcel Kahan & Edward
Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 GEO. L.J. 1227 (2008) (describing the
complicated nature of the U.S. corporate voting system and proposing ideas for reform).
172Promninent examples of dual-class companies include Ford Motor Company, Google
Inc., and The New York Times Company. See Ford Motor Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule
14A) (Apr. 3, 2009); Google Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (Mar. 24, 2009); The New
York Times Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (Mar. 11, 2009). In 2006, the Times's Board
was under attack by investors seeking to eliminate this protective device. See Jeremy W. Peters,
Group Urges Investors Not to Back Times Co. Board, N.Y. TiMEs, Apr. 6, 2007, at C2.
However, the company's proxy statement for its 2009 annual meeting shows that the Sulzberger
family trust continues to control 89 percent of the Class B shares, which are entitled to elect
ten of the fifteen directors. New York Times Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A),
at 1, 5-6 (Mar. 11, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data
/71691/000104746909002454/a2 l9O27Ozdefl4a.htm.
173For interesting materials on maggot therapy, see University of California at Irvine,
Maggot Therapy Project, http://www.ucihs.uci.edu/son/pathology/sherman/homejpg.htm (last
visited Apr. 7, 2009).
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corporation that is in transition-that is migrating from
underperforming to well-run-is at serious risk of attack even though
there is nothing fundamentally wrong with its current governance or
strategy. 174 So long as the insurgents carefully read the corporate law
and charter/bylaw provisions that govern nominations, they are a
serious threat to win the contest. 77' And in the Wall Street world
where "greed is good," 176 you can be certain that abuses will occur,
that good companies will be attacked, and that pirates will win. That's
villainy, in my book.
More importantly, as a lawyer in Ohio, I believe that regardless of
whether there is actual villainy involved, the entire hedge fund
approach to life violates the principles of our constituency statute and
good corporate governance. By aggressively pushing Boards to
generate short-term returns to shareholders, hedge funds pressure
Boards to ignore the long-term and, especially, to favor the short-term
interests of the shareholders versus the long-term interests of the
corporation as a whole. There is no obligation for the Board to
maximize short-term shareholder wealth, and yet that is precisely the
goal of the hedge fund. Therefore, I believe that we should continue
to explore defenses against such attacks.
F. ConditionRed: Corporate Takeovers
The ultimate substantive corporate governance exercise is the
takeover battle, be it in the form of a proxy battle to unseat a majority
of the incumbent directors, a hostile tender offer, or initiation of a
takeover battle through a bear hug letter. After all, what is more
fundamental to substantive governance than the decision on who
leads the company or whether to remain an independent company?
Institutional investors-taken as a whole-play a significant role in
corporate takeovers. First, some corporate raiders, while known
14

1 See Bratton, supra note 148, at 1397-98 (describing attacks by Pershing Square on
McDonald's in 2006 and similar attacks in 2005 on Beverly Enterprises).
175Targets have included such well-known companies as General Motors (fund: Tracinda
Corp., led by Kirk Kerkorian), Heinz and Wendy's (fund: Trian Fund Management, led by
Nelson Peltz), Waste Management and Mattel (fund: Relational Investors, led by Ralph
Whitworth). See Der Hovanesian, supra note 150, at 72 (describing the hedge fund pressure
exerted on General Motors, Waste Management, and Mattel); Tully, supra note 152, at 84
(describing the Heinz and Wendy's deals).
176Made famous in a speech made by Michael Douglas in his role as Gordon Gekko
in WALL STREET (Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. 1987), this phrase is now part of the
national debate over how to compensate Wall Street bankers. See Roy C. Smith, Greed is
Good, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2009, at WI, available at http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB123396915233059229.html; Kimberley A. Strassel, 'Greed' is Not Good,
WALL ST. J. , Mar. 20, 2009, at A 13, available at http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB 123 75 1023 925990683.htmi.
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through their larger-than-life sized leaders (both Pickens and Icahn
were using other peoples' money to make their raids in the 1980s), 1 17
are institutional investors. Second, institutional shareholders typically
hold more than a majority of the target's shares, and so have a large
say in the outcome of the tender offer or merger vote.17 8 Third, fewer
institutional investors than individual shareholders have emotional
ties to the company and therefore are less likely to support
management in a knee-jerk fashion, thereby becoming the swing vote
necessary for both the bidder and the target to woo. This latter point is
made more potent by the effect of the separation of investment and
179
voting decisions discussed above.
But in the takeover context, as elsewhere, institutional
shareholders are far from monolithic, and it is wrong to make any
broad statements about their role as institutional investors, rather than
individual shareholders. A few are the aggressors who start the
battles, others serve as agent provocateurs who weaken the targets
through hedge fund attacks, softening the targets up for a real bidder
to come in and "help the shareholders." Some will support the
takeover because they believe the short-term gain represented by the
offer price to be greater than the long-term reward of holding on and
following an alternative plan. Given the risks involved, others take
the opposite view. Some are arbitrageurs, speculators who came into
the stock precisely because it was in play and there is money to be
made trading on the risk that the deal won't happen. Correspondingly,
other, longer term investors may have sold them their shares because
their fiduciary obligations forced them to liquidate shares rather than
risk the loss of the takeover premium built into the current stock price
should the offer terminate. Some will look at the issue through the
eyes of RiskMetrics or its competitors; others make their own
decision. And some (many companies hope it is someone like Warren
Buffet) will ride to the beleaguered directors' aid as white squires to
help fend off the attack. Bottom line, it doesn't make a lot of sense to
talk about them as a group.
I approach takeover battles from the point of view of an Ohio
lawyer. As discussed above in Part 111, in this state we have a
fundamentally different view of corporations and their relationship
with their shareholders than in Delaware. In Delaware, the Board's
sole constituency (at least for solvent corporations) is the
177 BRUCE

WASSERSTEIN, BIG DEAL: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN THE DIGITAL AGE,

168 (2001).
178Sesupra text accompanying notes 84-85.
179 Sesupra text accompanying notes 130-3 1.
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shareholders. 80Here in Ohio, that's not the case. Ohio corporate
Boards must consider the interests of the shareholders but are also
free to consider-and make decisions based on-the interests of other
constituencies.18 1 This makes takeovers in Ohio a rather different
matter, philosophically, than in Delaware.
This fundamental difference in philosophy explains why, for
example, Revlon duties 182 do not apply in Ohio1 83 -there is no
obligation of directors, even once they start down the road of selling
the company, to take on the role of an auctioneer whose duty is to
extract the highest and best price for the shareholders. Instead,
directors are free to consider the negative impact of a transaction on
the corporation's other constituents, or to take the view that the
interests of long-term shareholders outweigh those of short-term
investors or speculators.184 Perhaps this is where the relationship of
institutional investors toward an Ohio corporation is most at variance
with their Delaware counterparts. In Delaware there is no difference
between the interests of a Johnny-come-lately hedge fund, an
arbitrageur hoping for a quick sale, and investors who want to be in
the shares for a long time. In Ohio, on the other hand, the Board is
free to differentiate between short-term interests and long-term
interests, and distinguish between short-term shareholders and longterm shareholders (as our control share acquisition act explicitly does
with regards to arbitrageurs). 18 5 And an Ohio Board may, by statute,
consider the impact of the transaction on employees, suppliers,
customers, the municipalities in which plants are located, the
economy of the state, and much more.'186 Therefore, in an Ohio
corporation, even in a takeover situation, shareholders may be viewed
not as supreme, but as being at most first among equals. Of course,
shareholders have the ultimate say in who serves as directors, so the
shareholders are not completely powerless to persuade the directors to
See supra text accompanying notes 49-52.
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (West Supp. 2009) (stating that directors may
also consider interests of employees, customers, creditors, suppliers, the state and national
economy, society at large, and the interests of the corporation and its shareholders over varying
periods of time).
2
18 See supra note 52.
183Although the Ohio Supreme Court has not reached this holding, a statement to this
effect was contained in the concurring opinion of Justice Holmes in the court's decision in
Stepak v. Schey, 553 N.E.2d 1072, 1077-78 (Ohio 1990).
184See OHIlO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701 .59(E)(4) (allowing consideration of "[tlhe long-term
as well as short-term interests of the corporation and its shareholders")(emphasis added).
185See id. § 1701.831(E)(1) (requiring a second majority to approve any control share
acquisition). This second majority excludes "interested shares." id., as defined in section
170 1.01 (CC), which includes shares acquired after first public disclosure of a control share bid,
see id. § 170 1.0 1(CC)(1)(d).
6
18 See id. § 1701.59(E).
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surrender control. But the shareholders can't compel the directors to
act simply by threat of lawsuits for breach of their fiduciary duties.
Under either an Ohio or Delaware analysis, those who seek to take
over public company targets may be heroes in those circumstances
where bad management is actually retarding the enterprise, or where
the acquirer is able to productively consolidate the target with another
portfolio investment to improve the value of both. In these cases.
under the Delaware analysis, if shareholders of the public company
are paid a price for their shares that exceeds their present value using
any realistic growth scenarios, the institutional investor is indeed a
hero. In Ohio, we'd perhaps want to add in consideration of other
constituencies. If the cost is a net Loss of jobs in Ohio or other bad
effect on our economy, this may offset the benefits derived by
shareholders and so reduce or eliminate the heroic stature of the
attacker.
As I earlier said in the context of hedge fund attacks, there are
times when bidders are villains, such as when hostile takeovers target
a company that has started its recovery from a downturn, whether
caused by poor management or otherwise, but that has not yet reached
its optimal performance level. It is during this period that a
corporation is most vulnerable. When it is in the trough of a
downturn, it is often too damaged to attract buyers, other than
liquidators, and when it is at the top of its performance cycle, it may
be too costly for financial buyers to be interested. But when it has
developed a plan to recover and is on its way up, buyers understand
that if they can grab the company at that moment, they may well buy
it at a depressed price, reaping rewards that the target's shareholders
would have enjoyed had the company remained independent. The risk
of such a villainous attack is especially high if the buyer aligns itself
with management to effect a management buyout/going private
transaction, since management is a willing co-conspirator, or even
promoter, of the transaction.
CONCLUSION

In my comments, I have tried to show how one "recovering"
corporate governance lawyer thinks about corporate governance and
the role of institutional investors. I have emphasized the framework
that an Ohio practitioner uses in thinking about corporate governance
issues, because it is so different than that used in Delaware. I will
leave to another day any debate over the issue of whether Ohio's
approach is the correct one. There are many economists and
academics who argue for shareholder primacy. But economists and
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academics neither legislate nor vote in great numbers, and litigants
who depend on their argument to sway a court, when that court has in
front of it a clearly drafted statute to the contrary, will lose.
I have also outlined ways that I have seen institutional
shareholders impact corporate governance. I will end as I began, by
saying it is not really possible to view institutional investors as a
monolithic group and that, under differing circumstances, they may
be either heroes or villains, but more commonly are neither. Bottom
line, they are essential parts of the corporate governance landscape,
and lawyers cannot ignore their importance.

